




THE EVOLVING SOVIET NAVY

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Why is the Soviet Navy developing as it is? The answer will enable us to understand better where the Soviet Navy is going in terms of force structure and employment. If we can predict these with accuracy, it should help us to know what we should be doing about it.

Since the 1940s the Soviet Navy has been identified as the most likely potential adversary of the U.S. Navy. But it was only in the mid-1960s that any rigorous effort was made to understand what was behind the Soviet Navy's growth and development. By chance, that effort coincided with the shift of the Soviet Navy away from a primarily defensive coastal defense role towards a more outward-looking, blue-water strategy. That shift marked a threatening new avenue in Soviet foreign and naval policy, and the need to understand what was behind the Soviet Navy's growth became all the more important.

The way that the Soviet Navy has evolved over the past three decades suggests that it has not developed with anywhere near the coherence and uniform purposefulness that most outside observers have been ready to grant. Nor does there appear to be any clear, explicit, and generally agreed long-range plan for that navy's development. Instead, a careful review shows it to be more likely that a variety of imperatives has been leading the Soviet Navy along a somewhat meandering path to a position of respect and potency upon the world's oceans. Among these imperatives are very real purposes of national defense and, more lately, the use of the navy to support Soviet foreign policy interests. Also included, however, are economic, technological, and bureaucratic imperatives that over time have developed an inertia that would be difficult to arrest even if the higher echelons of the Soviet political leadership might at some point feel that a given size and stature of the navy is ample.

Owing to this complex arrangement of overlapping motives, single-reason explanations of the rise of the Soviet Navy have all fallen short. Conventional seapower theories, Russian history, and

geography, and even bureaucratic models have at best explained only one aspect or one period of the phenomenon. But they have proven inadequate when the attempt was made to stretch them to fit all of the circumstances since the Soviet Navy's growth began after World War II.

Although understanding the Soviet Navy's development would in no way reduce the reality of its existence, it would lend a better perspective from which to predict developments, to interpret and evaluate each development as it arises, and to prepare for what the Soviet Union may do with its navy in the future. Without an adequate model of the behavioral style of the Soviet Navy, even perfect factual information is likely to be misinterpreted or distorted through erroneous evaluation. At best it would give minimal tactical warning of imminent developments; more likely it would only tell what had already happened, and not truly prepare us for what is to come.

Before moving on from the "rational" explanations of Soviet naval development that are grounded in concepts of Soviet policy imperatives and threat perceptions, it is important to point out that this thesis does not challenge most of the assumptions that the rational analysts make. Instead, this thesis proceeds from the same basis: that distinctly Russian perspectives are at the foundation of the Soviet political, defense, and naval establishments. As such, the perspectives of each of these organizations have been and will continue to be profoundly influenced by the attitudes and objectives of the political, economic and historical bases from which they sprung, and to which they must continually be responsive. But there seems to be much more to the growth of the Soviet Navy than this argument allows. For instance, distinctly Russian perspectives of threats seem quite inadequate to explain the rate of development of the Soviet Navy that, in all, has been quite steady over the course of 30 years in terms of budget allocation and ships delivered. Similarly, perspectives ascribed to the Russians based solely on "threats" or defensive concepts seem inadequate to explain the most recent developments in the Soviet Navy, particularly those of the 1970s that culminated in the *Kiev*, a multipurpose highly capable ship capable of launching and recovering fixed-wing aircraft.

What seems to have happened is that the conclusions of such analysts as Herrick, McGwire, and others—that may have been close to the mark for the formative years of the Soviet Navy—have been overtaken by the very phenomena that they were trying to explain. Sometime in the mid-1960s new imperatives seem to have

entered the picture, imperatives of a quite different nature from those that Herrick and MccGwire identified. These imperatives have for the most part been internal rather than external, that is, they have originated and worked from *within* the interrelated Soviet political, economic, military and naval system rather than from outside of it. Although the Soviet system does continue to respond to external threats and to the nation's inherently insecure and thus defensive national outlook, these newer developments are to a great extent *only* explainable in terms of economic pressures, bureaucratic politics, and institutional perspectives.

There are some who already have suggested that there might be more to the development of the Soviet Navy than just Russian defensive perspectives. It has been noted by some that the progress of technological feasibility rather than operational requirements may actually be the key determinant in weapons system development. ("The Soviet government [might have] built the ships it was technically capable of building, and then pronounced in favor of a naval strategy that would suit the ships it had built.")¹ With respect to uses of naval forces, increasing attention is being given to the notion that the instrument may shape the will,² and hence that the existence of forces which are useful for intervention—even if they were not designed for that purpose—may lead to a decision to use those forces for reasons quite different from those originally intended.

This study deals with these ideas as they relate to the evolution of the Soviet Navy. It proceeds, therefore, from several different hypotheses than have most previous efforts. The first is that factors which provide momentum in the Soviet economic system are of considerable value in understanding why particular ships, airplanes, or missiles appeared at a given time and in a certain sequence. The factors that provide momentum include the dynamics of the Soviet economy, the forward march of technology, and the political system of priorities of the Soviet Communist Party.

The second hypothesis is that the Soviet Navy has succeeded in achieving a degree of autonomy within the Soviet system and that it has in turn used this autonomy to pursue goals of its own that it holds as a vital, dynamic organization with norms and values akin to those of other organizations.

The third and final hypothesis of this study is that rather than being atypical among such organizations, the Soviet Navy is, after all, a navy and as such it has specific goals, norms, values and perspectives that are quite similar to those of other navies but

which may be quite unlike those of other organizations even within the same country.

To begin to understand the development of the Soviet Navy, that development must be seen as an ongoing process made up of a combination of imperatives that only begin to be explained by such pervasive factors as the Soviet national psyche, political system and resource-allocation procedure. These reasons have changed over time as domestic political circumstances, foreign policy goals, and perceptions of the threat have changed. Most importantly, perhaps, it is possible at any time to identify not just one but many "primary" reasons for the Soviet Navy's rise, even within the Soviet Union itself. In fact there may well be within the Soviet Union different perceptions held by different actor-groups on why the Soviet Navy is being built, how it is to be employed, or even what it actually looks like.

But if any one interest group has held a relatively constant view of where the Soviet Navy has been headed, it is the Soviet Navy's own leaders. This is not to say that their perspective has not itself been an evolutionary one. On the contrary, their vision of what the Soviet Navy should be has unfolded only as their ability to fulfill that vision has increased. Nevertheless, over the long run of 30 years the Soviet Navy has gradually grown through identifiable stages from a "green-water" coastal protection navy and now aspires to be a "blue-water" oceangoing one. In short, the course which the Soviet Navy has followed in its development matches a pattern that has been followed by other major navies, not the least of which is the U.S. Navy itself.

In essence, the Soviet Navy to a considerable extent has been developing in accordance with a professional self-image held by the leaders of the Soviet Navy that, despite different national perspectives and tasks, has been held by most naval officers of most navies. This self-image consists of general ideas of how a "first-class navy" should look and operate, an innate pursuit of professional self-respect and a very human desire to be "number one," all of which have come to culminate in a vaguely perceived "dream navy." It is towards this "dream navy" that the Soviet Navy has been developing even if in somewhat halting, cautious, piecemeal fashion. What is particularly significant is that this professional self-image is not the same one held by higher echelons of the Soviet Union, and consequently the "dream-navy" towards which the naval leadership is moving may not be the same navy that the political leadership wants or even thinks it is getting. There is increasing disparity between views of the Soviet Navy and

those of the Soviet political leadership; this disparity has profound implications for the future development of the Soviet Navy, for its potential employment in both war and peace, and consequently for the American Navy which must treat with it.

The Thesis Explained. The nature of the professional self-image which is held by the Soviet naval leadership is not unlike that which is held by many elites, and, most notably for the purposes of this study, most naval officers of most navies. For reasons of professional self-image, an involved member of such an elite naturally desires to see his organization grow, to have its influence expand, and to share in the respect that it earns from within and without. In the realm of navies, however, the very essence of professional self-image is the ability to sail unhindered among the world's oceans, supporting national objectives and promoting national interests in any manner and location where it is possible to do so. Pursuit of this naval image has been argued rationally on many grounds, based on how naval power can support the particular needs of a particular country, and many a good case has been made using very different criteria and different geostrategic factors.* The point is that in virtually every case the point has been made that a navy is necessary, functional, and strategically indispensable. However, these logically correct cases that support the self-image of the naval professional almost invariably run up against political and financial realities when the time comes for the nation in question to allocate resources to its navy. As a result, fulfillment of the self-image will almost surely be incremental, and may include tangential developments or backtracking for the sake of political expediency. However, as long as—and as far as—sufficient resources, commitment, and political opportunity allow, over the longer run a navy will tend to develop steadily and inexorably towards an all-purpose, “blue-water” navy oriented towards a very Mahanian “command-of-the-seas” strategic concept. It is this sort of exceedingly subtle dynamic that is believed to have been included in the thinking of the leaders of Soviet naval establishment even if they themselves do not explicitly realize it.

This thesis serves to explain why previous theories (which for the most part have attempted to find a single continuing rationale

*Mahan provided the invaluable service of relating naval power to America's strategic requirements. Because he was so effective in doing so for America, however, is no reason that his system has to apply to all or even any other country, especially one with such a different geostrategic setting as the Soviet Union.

interwoven throughout the development of the Soviet Navy and which have virtually unanimously proceeded from the idea that the Soviet Navy is a uniquely Russian phenomenon) have been inadequate. It also would explain why such external onlookers as the United States proceed erroneously on the assumption that there *must* be some sort of a "Master Plan," when the Soviets themselves see nothing of the kind. The Soviets may in fact be too close to the trees to see the forest, and we should not be too quick to ascribe to them an ingeniousness, innovation, and single-minded coherence and direction that they have not demonstrated since the days of Lenin and Stalin.

To sum up the major points of this thesis as it pertains to the development of the Soviet Navy:

Such a "dream-navy" is based on a professional self-image not uncommon to naval officers in the service of any country regarding their own navy.

This professional self-image is not shared by high Soviet political leaders, resulting in Soviet naval leadership often marching to a different drumbeat from that which "official" Soviet policy is beating.

As such, the "dream-navy" of Soviet naval officers is responsive to specific Russian geostrategic defense considerations only where it is expedient or politically imperative to do so.

The "dream-navy" itself is only vaguely perceived at best even by the Soviet naval leaders and consequently can only be promoted one stage at a time.

Some Ramifications. The conclusions and implications which flow from such a thesis are in many ways revolutionary. For one thing, there is every likelihood that the Soviet naval leaders will want to continue to develop the Soviet Navy as a "blue-water" navy, whether or not such a navy is specifically desired by the Soviet political leadership, or really necessary for defensive or geostrategic reasons. In fact, the vision the Soviet naval leadership is pursuing is probably *not* the same one held by the highest echelons of the Soviet political leadership. Rather, the older, conservative civilians that constitute the Soviet Union's political leadership still think of the Soviet Navy as largely defensive in its nature, structured and employed for purposes of homeland defense. If this is true, it would go a long way towards explaining why the Soviet Navy so often seems to be saying one thing, but doing something entirely different.

Incorporating the perceptions of the naval element of the Soviet bureaucracy into the larger model also leads to some major predictions concerning the future of the Soviet Navy:

The relatively orderly political process by which the Soviet Union once allocated resources will continue to bear decreasing resemblance to the newer reality of dog-eat-dog infighting in which each interested faction haggles for the most it can get. Less regard will be given to centralized long-range planning, and each political faction will tend to go its own way in supporting its particular perception of what the Soviet national interest is. Not the least of these will be the Soviet Defense Establishment, leading to directions of growth and modernization of the military machine that bear little relationship to such enunciated national policies as *détente* or coexistence.

With different factions pulling in different directions, there will be a growing divergence of the Soviet Union's political commitments from its military capabilities. In the case of the Soviet Army this will mean a continued buildup of already preponderant strength on the Soviet Union's land borders, leading others to the inevitable conclusion that such a buildup is totally unjustified unless a preemptive invasion is planned. But because most new political commitments will be made overseas, the burden of supporting them will fall to the Soviet Navy. For its part, the Soviet Navy can be expected to encourage the making of such commitments in order to give itself a *prima facie* case for further growth and modernization, but it will nevertheless continue to tailor that growth and employ forces in accordance with the fulfillment of its own self-image, rather than specifically to support those overseas political commitments.

The rationale used by Soviet defense officials and naval leaders to justify further development will bear little resemblance to the navy that they actually build, or more importantly, to the ways in which that navy is actually employed. So long as they couch it in Communist rhetoric, those arguing for increased capabilities will not be adverse to saying whatever the Soviet leadership wants to hear (or is willing to pay for), or to play upon the fears or hopes or both of political leaders. But in the end it will pay little attention to what the leadership actually *thinks* it obligated funds for.

Once naval platforms are built, they will be operated primarily in accordance with the Soviet Naval Establishment's image of how a first-class world navy should operate. As James Cable concluded after studying the historical uses of other navies in peacetime,

"The motives for which warships are built seldom foreshadow the actual nature of their employment, even in war, and are almost irrelevant to their utility in times of peace."³ Such a conclusion seems highly applicable to what is now occurring within the Soviet Union.

In searching for a model after which to fashion a modern first-class navy, Soviet naval leaders have not had to look far. Since the latter half of World War II the U.S. Navy has been the epitome of all that to which navies have ever aspired, going virtually anywhere and doing anything. Most specifically, since the mid-1950s this has included constraining Soviet policy options and initiatives in areas far from America's own territory. Consequently it would not be surprising if, even as they have seen the American Navy as the threat to be countered, they have also unconsciously used the U.S. Navy as the embodiment of their vision of what a first-class navy should be. Thus, it may be predictable that the Soviet Navy will want to continue to evolve into an image of the U.S. Navy replete with a surface fleet of aircraft carriers, a mobile amphibious force, and "blue-water" endurance capabilities, all of which do not appear to be justified by Russian geostrategic problems, Soviet political rhetoric, or even their espoused defensive doctrine.

It is worth pausing to reflect that if the Soviet Navy is in fact being developed and employed with considerable autonomy, it is only a short step until it is also deployed quite autonomously into a crisis theater in which it might then find itself eyeball-to-eyeball with the U.S. Navy (which was responding similarly but for reasons of its own), in a situation in which neither side intended nor expected such a confrontation but from which neither might be able to back down. Increasing autonomy of the Soviet naval leadership in controlling its own forces during crises, then, is not a development to be taken lightly in the West, but carries with it the seeds of potential engagement, even if such is not intended by the political leadership of either side.

The analysis portion of the study is divided into two sections. The largest section of the analysis traces the evolution of the modern Soviet Navy through its development since World War II. Then, present Soviet naval missions are analyzed and prospects for the future—including indicators to be watched—are identified. The appendixes list various Soviet hardware developments since 1950.

CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION

The evolution of the Soviet Navy since World War II can be divided into six phases:

- 1945–1953: Postwar Recovery Phase
- 1953–1956: Post-Stalin Retrenchment Phase
- 1956–1961: Counter Massive Retaliation Phase
- 1961–1964: Transition Phase
- 1964–1968: Shift to Blue Water Phase
- 1968–Present: Détente, Soviet Style

Major changes in Soviet foreign and defense policies mark the transitions between phases. In most cases those changes only became apparent to Western observers some time later. These six phases will be examined with special attention given to the relationship between national policies and specific naval developments. The reader may find Appendix 1 helpful in understanding the sequence of introduction of different classes of ships, airplanes and weapons.*

Phase I (1945–1953): Postwar Recovery Phase. The Soviet Navy emerged from World War II with a substantial submarine force, limited surface forces, and minimal political clout. Because the submarine shipbuilding yards had remained in Russian hands, the Soviet submarine force at the end of war was larger than that with which it had entered the war. The surface force was not so lucky: the three yards that built surface ships had all been located in areas seized by Germany during the 1941 invasion. As a result, Soviet surface ship production experienced a near total hiatus during the war. The surface force was expanded at the war's end by acquiring ships

*In order to preserve the unclassified content of this paper, only unclassified sources have been used to construct the tables and graphs. In cases where unclassified sources disagreed a composite figure was used.

from the remnants of the German and Japanese Navies, but such ships were for the most part older and smaller, with limited steaming radii. Moreover, as the Soviet Navy's operational experience during the war had been virtually nil, the level of experience was extremely low. Consequently numbers of ships was hardly a true measure of the doleful operational status of the Soviet Navy in 1945.

Its minimal contributions to the war effort had put the Soviet Navy at an even greater disadvantage politically. In the Soviet Union, participation in World War II—the “Great Patriotic Struggle”—was the yardstick by which the reputation of the armed services was measured.* To appreciate this perspective fully it must be recognized that to the Soviets, World War II was a struggle for survival (a correct assumption on their part at least as far as Hitler was concerned). Participation in the victory therefore automatically conferred on the participant the high honor of having served the nation with its corresponding political capital. Being able to claim a share of the “glorious victory” over Hitler's Germany is still a credential that enhances the prestige, self-respect, and political clout of individuals and organizations alike.

Despite its ignominious political status at the end of the war, two facts enabled the Soviet Navy to survive and develop in the immediate postwar years. The first was the personal sponsorship of Josef Stalin. The other was the traditional Russian insecurity regarding the potential invasion threat. Stalin had been a “big-navy” man long before the onset of the war. He had endeavored to build a fleet that included battle-ships and even aircraft carriers,¹ but his plans had repeatedly been thwarted by the more pressing needs of the Soviet economy. Only in the latter stages of the 1937-41 5-Year Plan had Stalin's building program actually gotten underway, and it was the ships of this program that were on the building ways when Germany invaded. With the war over, Stalin wasted no time in revitalizing his plans, declaring as early as July 1945 that the Soviet Union would have “a still stronger and more powerful navy.”²

*And still is. Gorshkov's repeated efforts to write a revisionist history of the Soviet Navy's participation in the war (in his “Navies in War and Peace” series, in the *Combat Courses of the Soviet Navy*, and in *Seapower of the State*) are transparent attempts to reverse the fact that in political circles the Soviet Navy is still lowest in the pecking order in large part because it had little to contribute to the “Great Patriotic War.”

Stalin's desire for a large surface navy had undoubtedly been amplified by the fact that he had failed in the prewar years to prepare the Soviet Union to defend itself adequately against invasion. When Hitler began his assault on the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin was still assuring the Soviet people (and army) that Hitler would not do any such thing. Because of this miscalculation the effects of the German invasion were probably far worse than they might have been. In the postwar years, therefore, Stalin was personally committed to sparing no expense in providing security against any attack, from any quarter, by any potential adversary.³ That the Americans had demonstrated convincingly during the war that massive amphibious invasion was possible added a new dimension to Soviet defense planning. Unable immediately to protect their own maritime border by a ring of puppet states, only the Soviets own military forces would serve for such a mission.⁴ This clearly translated into a need to develop a reliable capability for the Soviet Navy to provide defense against attacks from the sea. Hence, Stalin's personal preference for a large navy and his desire to defend all borders clearly complemented each other.

To implement Stalin's order and provide the sort of coastal protection needed, no particular innovations in shipbuilding nor naval armament were required. The Soviet Navy would require ships of World War II design capable of operating under air cover that could be flown from bases in the Soviet Union. New bomber aircraft would be required to strike armies or navies attempting to approach the Soviet homeland. But most of all the Soviet Navy would need submarines. Submarines as a frontline defense offered several advantages from the Soviet perspective. Submarines could operate in secrecy and would be able to execute their mission close to home, simplify logistics and facilitate command and control. Perhaps most significantly, the capability readily existed: the Soviet Union already had a sizable number of submarines in service and had, moreover, shepherded home at war's end many German submarine engineers who would be able to design new submarines for the Soviet Fleet.

The results of this building program first appeared in the early 1950s. The first surface ships to reach the fleet after the war were the *Skoryy*-class destroyer in 1949 and the *Sverdlov* cruiser in 1952, although these were hulls designed and laid before or during the war. The first surface ship to be designed and built after the war did not enter service until 1954. In that year the *Kola*-class destroyer escort was introduced and was followed in rapid

succession by the *Kotlin* and *Tallinn**-class destroyers in 1955 and by the *Riga* destroyer escort in 1956. The first Soviet-built submarine of the postwar era was the *Zulu* that appeared in 1952. The *Zulu* was followed by the *Whiskey*-class in 1954 and the *Quebec*-class in 1956. Also during this period new long-range bombers were being developed. The *Badger*, *Bear*, and *Bison* all appeared in 1954-55 having been adapted for use by the Soviet Naval Air Force.

To summarize these developments, during the first decade following the end of World War II, the Soviet Union's defense planners were guided by Stalin's personal ideas and their own fears concerning any future invasions. The result was the adoption of a defensive strategy implemented through the building up of the "still stronger and more powerful navy" Stalin directed to be built. At first this stronger navy consisted only of pre-World War II vintage Soviet surface ships, German and Japanese naval ships captured at the end of the war, and submarines. By the late 1940s, the Soviet Union was able to begin construction of its own surface ships, and several classes of standard-design cruisers, destroyers, and escorts were laid down around the turn of the decade. As 1953 came to an end and Stalin gone, the active American military effort on the U.S.S.R.'s Pacific flank halted, new Soviet military hardware coming into service, and America's exclusive ownership of nuclear weapons broken, the defense picture may have looked better to the Kremlin's defense planners than it had at any time since 1947.

Two questions about this period warrant attention because of their relevance to our understanding of the Soviet Navy today. The first concerns the views of the Soviet political leadership regarding the use of the fleet; the second concerns the degree of harmony (or disharmony) that existed between the political leaders and the naval leaders regarding the ways in which the Soviet Navy was to be built and employed.

How Stalin would have used his fleet once he had it relates closely to the debate that has arisen in recent years between the so-called cold warriors who saw Russian aims in the postwar period as being essentially expansionist,⁵ and the cold war revisionists who see Russian policies in that period as having been largely forced upon them by the aloof and uncomprehending

*The *Tallinn*, a single-ship class, was probably the prototype of a competitive design to the *Kotlin*. The *Krupnyy* may have been yet a third competitive design later diverted for use as a surface-to-surface missile platform.

leaders of the United States.⁶ While it is not the intent here to enter this debate, there seems little question that mutual distrust existed between the United States and Soviet Union since long before 1941, and postwar experiences such as those in Poland and Czechoslovakia suggest that Stalin's policies were something more than defensive reactions to Western pressures. What the Soviets did is known; what their reasoning and intentions may have been are not.

The historical evidence suggests that Stalin probably was not very concerned with what Americans thought or even with what they said. Instead, he seems to have been acting from a more generalized idea of the threat, and was as concerned with shoring up his own position, with eliminating the Russian's own perception of vulnerability to invasion, and with deterring potential attacks from abroad as he was with actually planning to fight a war. It follows that the mere existence of a Soviet Navy would have provided the ends which were sought. The use of the fleet as an instrument of prestige, reassurance, and deterrence would have been even more credible if the Soviet Fleet were to sail upon the oceans of the world rather than remaining in home waters. The conclusion to which this leads is that once the fleet existed, whatever the reasons which had been given for building it, Stalin would have been likely to use it to enhance his own and Soviet prestige, to attempt to deter the West, and to intimidate his own puppet states. It would not have been the only time that the original concept of a fleet, the reasons given to justify building it, the way it was actually built, and the way it was used were inconsistent.

With respect to the second question, it has been usual to assume that the thinking of the leaders of the Soviet Navy has always been in line with that of the political leadership. It is curious to note, then, that Admiral Gorshkov has recently alluded to differences of opinion between the Soviet political and naval leadership that existed even in the immediate postwar era. In his Foreword to *The Combat Course of the Soviet Union*, an "in-house" handbook on Soviet naval history for Soviet naval officers, Gorshkov begins by describing the basic defensive rationale of the immediate postwar years:

The Navy, during the period of re-establishing the national economy and during the first 5-year plans, received minimal appropriations and was obliged to limit itself to the creation of such means as would entail the least economic

expenditures and yet support the military tasks of repulsing the aggressors' possible attacks from seaward. These units, then, were patrol boats which entered service simultaneously with repaired and refitted ships which were more powerful. In addition, work was undertaken on a broad front in strengthening the coastal defenses; the first steps were taken in refurbishing, in constructing and in placing into production new destroyers and also submarines. . . . In this manner, considering the condition of the economy and of the capability of industry, our nation strove to create, and did create in those years an adequately powerful defensive fleet, to which were coupled shore defense and (Naval) aviation.⁷

This conventional interpretation of the defensive orientation of Soviet defense planning barely hints that there might have been a desire in some quarters of the Soviet Navy to have been doing more in this period. His statement that the navy received only "minimal appropriations," and that it was "obliged to limit itself" suggests that there may have been some earnest debate about ends even in those days. In his next paragraph, however, Gorshkov is more explicit:

The period of formulating the Soviet Navy was characterized by bold inquiries and proposals as to the new forms and methods of conducting war at sea, and by investigations of the avenues looking to the most effective use of fleet forces for winning victory over a powerful maritime enemy, *and also by a decisive struggle against a variety of obsolescent concepts and ideas.* . . . A number of the Navy's officers spoke out for a large navy based on powerful surface forces, able to successfully engage in one-on-one combat with a strong enemy at sea.⁸ (Emphasis added.)

"Alas," laments Gorshkov, "such viewpoints were unrealistic at the time since they were at odds with the material-technical base which was then available to our country." The big-navy concept that the naval leadership apparently held in that period had to be postponed until the "material-technical base," that is, the economic resources, technical capacity, and the political will, existed to proceed with such a program.

These two questions go to the heart of two main contentions of this thesis. In the first place, the actual use of the Soviet Navy has been only infrequently in compliance with the advertised purposes

for which the ships were built. We must be careful, then, in accepting at face value any rationale that the Soviets themselves offer for force-development. Even if they themselves *think* they mean it, the broadened courses of action that their expanded capabilities make possible may in the end lead them to very different ideas of how the ships should actually be used. Moreover, the ways the ships are actually used may have more to do with the concepts that originally gave rise to those ships (the wish being the mother of the invention) than with either the rationale put forth to justify them or the material-technical base that determined in large measure the capabilities designed into them.

In light of Gorshkov's foreword to the officers of the Soviet Navy, the leaders of the Soviet Navy appear for a considerable time to have been longing for "a large navy based on powerful surface forces" but have been patiently awaiting the right combination of technological feasibility and political acceptability to bring their ideas to the fore. If such a vision has existed, the fact that it would seem to be rooted back in the immediate postwar days suggests that it owes little to basic defensive concepts put forth in the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, a large, blue-water navy can be seen to be a longstanding goal of Soviet naval officers that has probably existed at least for three decades, that has relatively little to do with defensive perspectives or "assigned missions," and that, in short, has continued to exist almost for its own sake. It is not, however, a single coordinated plan that the Soviet Navy has been waiting patiently to spring on the political leadership, but an idea—a professional self-image—that has existed from the beginning but which has itself evolved and crystallized only slowly, unevenly, sometimes even tangentially, but altogether inexorably towards a blue-water general-purpose navy.

Second Phase (1953–1956): Post-Stalin Retrenchment Phase. When Stalin died in March 1953 his ideas of a large and powerful navy were buried with him. Many of the newest ships that he had ordered were never completed. A period of political turmoil ensued until 1955 when Nikita Khrushchev finally accumulated sufficient power to stabilize the situation.

This turmoil seems not to have been limited to political power but to have extended into strategic defense. One reason for this is that Soviet leaders had apparently become disenchanted with some of the more adventurist aspects of Stalin's foreign policy and may have leaped at the chance to reverse course before the Soviet

Union found itself in a war it did not want with the United States. In retrospect, it seems likely that Stalin's obsession with security had all along been opposed by many in the Soviet bureaucracy who preferred to be getting on with rebuilding the Soviet economy rather than worrying about foreign affairs.

On the other hand, developments during this critical phase cannot be viewed solely in terms of Soviet politics. The announcement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on 12 January 1954 that henceforth America would "be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing"⁹ was undoubtedly taken to heart by Soviet leaders. Dulles' meaning was clear: the United States would not shrink from using atomic weapons even against the Soviet mainland. This new American policy, coming as it did after such reversals of American policy as the decisions to reintroduce ground troops onto the European continent, to engage in Korea, and to commence large-scale rearmament, led to considerable soul-searching in the Kremlin. Faced with these developments, the extensive defenses Stalin had prepared against invasions would be for naught if the Soviet homeland was destroyed by nuclear bombs. In view of the ingrained sense of insecurity and the still fresh memories of World War II, the renewed sense of vulnerability felt by the Soviet Union because of Dulles' announcement must have been shattering to the Russian psyche. That such a psychological catastrophe did occur within the Soviet Union does not seem to be much contended; what is in doubt is just how these effects influenced subsequent developments in Soviet defense policy.

Three arguments seem possible. MccGwire takes the announcement of the Dulles Doctrine as his point of departure for explaining later developments in the Soviet Navy that only became evident around 1960.¹⁰ From this perspective, the Soviets scrapped most of their existing plans for conventional defenses against conventional threats, and threw everything into a new attempt to neutralize the threat of an American nuclear strike. It is equally arguable that the cause-and-effect relationship was not as direct as MccGwire presumes. For one thing, the chaos that existed in the high political circles of the Soviet Union during this period seems sufficient to have precluded anything like the coherence and singleness of purpose MccGwire ascribes to Soviet defensive thinking. It also seems likely that it would have taken some time before the newly announced American policy was translated into specific capabilities by the Americans against which the Soviets could then construct specific defenses.

Because of these different interpretations, the period immediately following Stalin's death is one of the most controversial in the recent development of the Soviet Navy. Most commentators agree that the Soviet Navy was being dismantled during this period, but few agree on why. One school holds that it was being dismantled in order to reallocate resources to broader economic needs, while the MccGwire school sees the same phenomenon as having been undertaken deliberately with a view to trading off immediate capabilities against later gains against the nuclear threat.

Interestingly enough, Admiral Gorshkov recalls neither to have been the case. To him it was only a matter of the rate at which progress was being made. From his perspective, the fleet had not been dismantled at all but had continued to evolve as the result of the ongoing technological revolution then taking place in the Soviet Union. As he remembers it:

Soviet science made magnificent discoveries. It became practical to place at the service of the Fatherland's defense the latest attainments in the areas of nuclear armament, radio-electronics, atomic power, and missile development.¹¹

While Gorshkov is probably overselling the continuity aspect, he does have a point. In actuality the only dismantling that was done was in large ships. The *Kotlin* destroyer came into the fleet in 1955, two destroyer lines were introduced in 1956, and the *Krupnyy* and *Kilden*-class destroyers followed 2 years later. The *Sverdlov*-class cruiser was reduced from a series run of 24 to 14, and the *Stalingrad*-class large cruisers and the *Soviet Union*-class battleship were abandoned entirely. But Soviet submarine production seems not to have been affected at all by the words of Dulles. The *Whiskey* and *Romeo* classes appeared during the 1954-1956 period, and the *Golf* and *Foxtrot* classes seem certainly to have received continuing approval if not their original authorization during this phase. All in all, there is little evidence that any wrenching defense decisions of the sort MccGwire has deduced did in fact take place in the Soviet Union between Stalin's death and Khrushchev's accession. Clearly some pressures were exerted for a reallocation of resources towards the civilian sector of the economy, but the most likely determinant of defense policies actually seems to be something close to Gorshkov's recollection. What probably happened between 1953 and 1956 is that most Soviet policies including defense policy simply drifted along,

bending with each political wind while during the same period technology was in fact changing and would soon be able to offer new weapons systems.

In all, three major decisions seem to have been taken during this period that affected the future course of the Soviet Navy, all three of which were clearly related to technological progress.

The first decision was to explore taking the Soviet Union's newly acquired atomic bomb to sea on specially equipped submarines. The date at which this decision was taken cannot be firmly established, but it was between 1952 and 1955. It is possible that the original idea for such a weapon was Stalin's, and the idea of using atomic weapons to intimidate others smacks strongly of Stalin's way of doing business. In any case, the first Soviet test of a submarine-oriented ballistic missile was made in 1955 even though the weapon did not become operational (as the SS-N-4) until 1958 when it was deployed on the *Golf*-class submarine.*

The second decision during this period related to the use of long-range missilery to counter the air superiority that aircraft carriers gave to American naval forces. In the absence of air superiority, it was simply impossible for the Soviet Navy to challenge the American Fleet anywhere. But it was conceivable that "transcient air superiority" in the form of missiles could be wielded at a relatively low financial, technological, and political cost. Missile weaponry would provide the Soviet Navy with an offensive capability of its own—the only offensive capability it could possess without carriers or amphibious landing forces. Hence, the drive to develop missiles for shipboard use that resulted in the SS-N-1, SS-N-2, and SS-N-3 seems definitely to have originated in this period.

The third decision that must have been made during this period was to explore the potential of using nuclear energy as the propulsive force for Soviet submarines. Based on time elapsed until the first nuclear-powered submarine appeared in 1960, it seems likely that this decision was taken around 1954, the same year that *Nautilus* was commissioned into the American Navy.

*It is worth noting here that MccGwire attributes the Soviets 1967-68 "vintage" of ships to the Soviets surprise when the U.S.S. *George Washington* first deployed in 1961. But the fact that the SS-N-4 was first tested two years before the *George Washington* was even laid down leads one to suspect that the Soviets could not have been very "surprised" 6 years later when the Americans finally did deploy the Polaris missile.

In view of these three decisions, Gorshkov's perspective seems to emerge as a reasonably valid explanation for what was happening in the Soviet Navy during the period of post-Stalin retrenchment. Undoubtedly the Soviet Navy was organizationally traumatized by the cutbacks imposed under the post-Stalinist regime and was looking for a way to reverse that trend. But the very fact that new technological developments were being made carried with it a natural temptation to employ the new technologies for military purposes. Thus, during the 3 years after Stalin's death the technological dynamic seems to have exerted much more pressure towards what eventually transpired in the Soviet Navy than did more rational explanations based on threat considerations.

To summarize, during the 3 years following Stalin's death, Soviet defense policy seems to have been moving along several paths at once. One observable trend was the reaction against Stalin's all-out focus on security and foreign policy, and the resultant effect that heavy industry was devoted to producing military and naval hardware. In the 2 years following Stalin's death, priorities were switched and economic recovery came briefly to the fore. But until the political situation stabilized, nothing that resembled a unified, coordinated policy could be resolved. While the political scene was at a standstill, however, technology continued to move ahead and that in turn led the Soviet Navy into new paths that would affect its course for at least the next decade.

Third Phase (1956–1961): Counter Massive Retaliation Phase. Sometime before mid-1956, the political situation in the Soviet Union did stabilize. Nikita Khrushchev's elevation to Premier once again established a form of government that emphasized one-man rule, but with the important difference that Khrushchev was himself more subject to supervision by a bureaucratized form of government. Khrushchev's ouster of Malenkov by advocating the return of heavy industry to the highest priority in the economy signaled that the Soviet Armed Forces would have no problem getting the heavy equipment they desired, and in fact an increase in the Soviet Union's defense budget was one of Khrushchev's earliest acts.^{1 2}

Freed from its internal political struggles, the Soviet Government was able to turn its attention outward once again, and the major problem to be dealt with in foreign affairs was the threat that had been delivered by Dulles. In the years immediately

following its pronouncement, the “Massive Retaliation” doctrine provided a very real concern to Soviet planners. Lacking any effective means even to retaliate, the Soviets were in a vulnerable situation. When in 1956 it at last became politically possible to address the problem, almost any solution that offered to reduce that threat, irrespective of cost, was seized upon.¹³

It is during this phase that MccGwire’s “strategic reaction” thesis is most relevant. The Americans use of their aircraft carriers as platforms from which to launch a nuclear strike helped insure that the Soviet Navy would play a role in defending against the American nuclear threat. To thwart a carrier-launched airstrike only two options were possible. Either the carriers had to be taken out before they could launch their aircraft, or the aircraft had to be destroyed before they could deliver their weapons over Soviet territory. In characteristic fashion the Soviets pursued both courses but the Soviet Navy primarily focused on the first technique. Thus was born the strategy of the massive, preemptive, anticarrier strike launched from long range against American naval task groups.

MccGwire’s thesis sees this sort of thinking by the Soviets as determining all naval developments during this phase. It seems accurate as far as it goes. But what his thesis tends to discount too heavily is the ongoing technological evolution which had been taking place throughout the 1950s. To MccGwire, the application of this technology to military purposes was the result of a single decision to counter the carrier threat with missile technology. However, the sequence of events makes it far more likely that the technology was already in hand—or at least well along in development—and looking for an application. If this were the case, identifying the American aircraft carriers as the specific threat for the Soviet Navy to counter had merely provided the opening for the existing technology as well as for the natural institutional desire of the navy to want a piece of the action.

Discussing this period, Gorshkov does not even mention the CVA threat that supposedly was such a key factor in Soviet planning. Instead, his version is that:

New means of armed struggle, new in principle, permitted one to radically change the technical base in a short period and to create a qualitatively new type of armed forces—an oceanic navy, in which submarine forces, aviation, modern surface ships, and other kinds of forces underwent a harmonious development.¹⁴

Using this “changed technical base”—by which Gorshkov seems clearly to be referring to missile technology—the Soviet Navy did indeed enter a rapid and dramatic period of development. Missile technology was already well-developed in the Soviet Union by 1956 as is evident from the first test launch of the SS-N-4 SLBM in 1955 and the *Sputnik* launch only a year later. Presumably, tactical missiles became operational during this same period and, in a pattern which was to become characteristic, the Soviets rushed to backfit these weapons onto existing platforms and to design and construct new platforms primarily for the purpose of carrying the new weapons.

The Soviet program to incorporate missiles into their navy first became observable in the surface fleet. By 1958 the SS-N-1 surface-to-surface missile had been fitted onto four *Kotlins* (which then became known to the West as *Kilden*-class destroyers).¹⁵ The same missile was fitted onto the *Krupnyy*-class destroyer, which had been started in the early fifties but had been one of the victims of the post-Stalin cutbacks and had remained unfinished. Meanwhile, work went forward on two new classes of oceangoing surface ships designed primarily for the anticarrier warfare (ACW) mission. The first of these was the *Kynda*-class cruiser, the primary armament of which was the long-range SS-N-3 surface-to-surface missile. That only four *Kyndas* were built suggests that this class was envisioned as the successor to the four *Kildens* although of course there was no pressing reason to retire the *Kildens* simply because the *Kyndas* had arrived. The other surface ship to appear in this period was the *Kashin*-class DDG. There were two distinguishing features of *Kashin*: the SA-N-1 surface-to-air missile and its status as the world's first gas turbine powered combatant ship. The primary mission of *Kashin* was to provide defense for *Kyndas* against possible airstrikes from the carriers. Its gas turbine engines added nothing of a specific operational nature, and seem to have been more the result of a technological progress seeking an outlet than to fulfill a specific operational requirement.

To complement the long-range SS-N-3, the Soviets had simultaneously developed the short-range SS-N-2 surface-to-surface *Styx* missile. As was the case with the SS-N-3 and SA-N-1, the *Styx* was fitted on to existing patrol craft (the P-6 which thereby became the *Komar*) while simultaneously developing a dedicated platform, the *Osa* patrol craft. The shorter-range *Styx* clearly was viewed by the Soviets as a weapon for coastal defense (it was not backfitted to any oceangoing ship of

destroyer size or larger for over a decade)* nor, apparently, has it been deployed on any class of Soviet submarine.

Frequently overlooked is that despite the emphasis the Soviets were placing on the anticarrier mission during this period, the Soviet Navy was not allowed to ignore its coastal defense role. Three new classes of coastal defense craft, the *Petya*-class destroyer escort, *Poti*-class subchaser, and *Shersheen*-class PT were all introduced in 1962. Had the anticarrier mission received the exclusive emphasis which some have attributed to it, it would have been reasonable to expect that the coastal defense "pot" would have been robbed, and that the previous generation of these craft (which had, after all, only been introduced in 1956-1958) would have sufficed until the American aircraft carrier nuclear strike capability had been neutralized. As that was not the case, it seems reasonable to conclude that while the anticarrier mission may indeed have been the primary focus of attention during this phase, it was by no means the only naval mission being considered.

The new long-range SS-N-3 missile was also applied to the Soviet submarine fleet, again in the same pattern of backfitting while developing new dedicated platforms. Twelve *Whiskey*-class submarines were converted (in two modes, the *Longbin* and the *Twin Cylinder*) to carry the SS-N-3, reentering active service in 1961. These were followed a year later by the appearance of both the conventionally powered *Juliatt*-class and the nuclear-powered *Echo II* class both fitted with the same long-range SS-N-3 missile.

Nuclear propulsion was first employed in the Soviet Navy in the *November*-class SSN that appeared around 1960. The conventionally powered *Foxtrot* submarine that appeared in 1958 seems to have been the conventional counterpart to the nuclear propulsion line. Nuclear propulsion was introduced to the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet at about this same time. The *Golf* class which had only appeared in 1958 and the *Zulu V* which had been redesigned to carry the SS-N-4 were soon followed by the *Hotel* class in 1960. As was the case with both the tactical guided-missile submarine and the general-purpose oceangoing submarine lines, the conventionally powered *Golf* class remained in service to parallel the nuclear-powered *Hotel*, although the two were designed for the same mission. Apparently the Soviets have been

*It was in fact 12 years before a version of this missile was finally placed on ships of the oceangoing fleet. Even in that case, however, it may be significant that the short-range missile was not placed on dedicated platforms but was backfitted onto the relatively old *Kildens* and *Kashins*.

good at bringing new technology to fruition rapidly, but they have not been willing to gamble on their success.

In the realm of air-launched missiles, the Soviet Navy introduced no less than four different varieties of air-to-surface missiles in 1961. Demonstrating the same characteristic feature previously noted, the Soviets applied these four missiles to old as well as newer aircraft. The AS-1 *Kennel* and the AS-2 *Kipper* were strapped onto the *Badger* jet aircraft which had been in service since 1954 (making these new variations, respectively, the *Badger B* and *Badger C*). Meanwhile, the AS-3 was employed on the propeller-driven *Bear* aircraft using two different methods (making these variations the *Bear B* and *Bear C*). Finally, the new *Blinder* aircraft that appeared in 1961 carried the fourth missile, the AS-4 *Kitchen*, that had applications in strategic purposes as well as in the antiship mode.

Whether the new Soviet naval strategy was formulated before, during, or after the appearance of 1961-1962 "vintage" just described, the strategy was well-suited to the capabilities. The operating radius of the strike aircraft carried on the American carriers, the AJ-1, was 1,000 nautical miles. Soviet planners consequently based their defense perimeter on a 1,000-mile arc around Moscow.* This arc includes the Barents Sea, the coastal waters west of Norway and the North and Baltic Sea, cuts the Mediterranean between Italy and Libya, and includes within its sphere the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. In the theoretical version of Soviet naval strategy, then, it was these areas from which American aircraft carriers were to be excluded during periods of increased tension.¹⁶ That American carriers might already be operating within this 1,000-mile radius when tensions rose or when hostilities broke out apparently was not considered in Soviet planning. It was easier (and typical of Soviet planning) to think in terms of a single scenario, and the assumption that the Americans would try to penetrate the Soviet defense perimeters was—and still remains—a critical assumption in Soviet plans to execute their much ballyhooed massive preemptive strikes.

The commentator must ask himself how a nation could allow its naval strategy to depend so heavily on an assumption about what in reality is a key variable. The explanation seems to be that this naval strategy was logically consistent and thus offered a coherent

*Significantly, this 1,000 nautical mile arc is drawn from Moscow, and not from Soviet territorial borders, thus reinforcing the hypothesis that the Soviet Union has a propensity for viewing all security issues with a very Moscow-oriented perspective.

explanation of how the carrier attack could be repelled. Given the fact that the Soviet leaders in Moscow *wanted* to be convinced that the carrier threat could be neutralized, the hard questions were probably never asked (if indeed they were conceived at all).

Although the Soviet Navy could use this strategy to justify certain building programs, there nevertheless remained some very real problems in how it was going to fulfill its mission. It possessed the potential to deny certain ocean areas to the American Navy, and possibly to constrain American options under certain circumstances, but it did not have the capacity to maintain forward patrol stations or to use the sea space itself to any end. Such a situation would not long remain. Possessed of new impressive looking ships and powerful weapon systems, and having found a justifying rationale for continued development, a "revolution of rising expectations" had set in. It would only be a matter of time before the Soviet Navy would want more and better ships of all kinds—particularly "blue-water" ships. The trick would be to find a way to continue the existing trend by expanding the rationale—or finding a new one.

Fourth Phase (1961–1964): Transition Phase. The entry into the fleet of the impressive array of ships that had been conceived and designed since the mid-1950s marks the beginning of the transition of the Soviet Navy from a "green-water" navy (in its thinking as well as its hardware) to a "blue-water" navy. As Admiral Gorshkov put it:

For the first time in its history the Soviet Navy became a far-ranging navy, . . . capable of exerting a real influence on the cause and outcome of an armed struggle ranging over huge sea areas and in the conventional theatres of military activities.¹⁷

The change did not become evident until Gorshkov issued his "sail upon the oceans" order in 1964. It now seems evident that his order was not a casual pronouncement but had been germinating for some time.

To be sure, this period was a critical one for Soviet policies other than just naval policy. The adventurist nature of Soviet foreign policy—indeed, even Khrushchev's ability to continue to run that foreign policy—also seems to have come in for severe scrutiny beginning in 1961. Since 1957 Khrushchev had based his foreign policy towards the West on the presumed "missile gap"

that had existed since *Sputnik* was launched.* He had taken exceptional (for the Soviet Union) risks in crises ranging from Berlin to the Congo to Southeast Asia, confident—or at least so it would seem—that the United States would not dare to exercise its nuclear strike capability as long as doubt existed about whether it could do so with impunity. When in May 1961 President Kennedy released information that proved that the “missile gap” had after all been a myth, the basis on which Khrushchev had conducted foreign policy was instantly undermined. It is highly probable that many highly placed Soviet bureaucrats who had been holding their breath while Khrushchev ran his risks, tolerating such tactics only because they too believed that the “missile gap” existed, shuddered as they considered how close things had come to the brink and wondered if matters would have gone the same way had the Americans known (or been willing to act on the fact) that they did indeed still have decisive superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons.

Several results stemmed from this realization of continuing strategic inferiority. The first was a heightened commitment to correcting the strategic nuclear balance. This was doubtless an agreed solution as Khrushchev had always been a “big missile” man anyway. But other results were an increased skepticism about Khrushchev’s adventurist tactics on the part of Politburo members, and a new willingness to negotiate with the Americans on such issues as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. One other important result of the end of the “missile gap” seems to have been the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. Whether Khrushchev chose to place IRBMs in Cuba as a *result* of Kennedy’s 1961 announcement on the strategic balance as some have argued,¹⁸ or the wheels were already in motion and simply could not be stopped (by way of parallel one recalls that Kennedy had twice ordered American IRBMs out of Turkey without result¹⁹) is immaterial for our purposes. What was at stake once the crisis phase was entered on 24 October (the day the American quarantine began) was that the crisis was not *just* a showdown between the Soviet Union and the United States, but a showdown as well between

*It should be noted that another consideration of the Soviets during this phase was the rapidly developing split with the People’s Republic of China. That split certainly did Khrushchev no good, and he may even have been blamed for it by fundamentalists who perceived him to be ignoring the international brotherhood of Communists while he played crisis games with the Americans. In any case the sudden rise of another potential enemy on their border could not have pleased anyone in the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev probably came in for a major share of the blame for having allowed this to happen.

Khrushchev and the more conservative elements in the high levels of the Soviet bureaucracy. Khrushchev was in a no-win situation whatever he did, and his decision to back down may have avoided nuclear war but it also seriously weakened his claim to be the sole architect of Soviet foreign policy. Henceforth Soviet foreign policy would be more cautious and pragmatic, avoiding the sorts of crises that had marked the 1957-1962 period; eventually Khrushchev himself would be ousted.

These developments in the Soviet approach to foreign policy were important for the Soviet Navy. The growing professional self-image of the Soviet Navy that had been brought about between 1960 and 1962 as nuclear submarines, impressive looking surface ships, and a wide range of potent weapons systems entered service undoubtedly suffered a severe setback as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite the claims it had been making for 5 years about how it would soon be able to deal with the American Navy, the Soviet Navy was totally unable to prevent the American side from instituting a highly effective blockade that it then used as the lever to move events towards a solution very much to its liking. The question must have been asked whether the Soviet Navy was ever going to be able to do anything effective on the high seas, and demands were no doubt heard that the navy should be cut back. But the counterargument to this would have been that the Soviet Navy simply did not have *enough*. If the Soviet Navy had possessed its own local air cover, for example, or long-range aircraft based overseas, or a sustained blue-water capacity (so the argument probably went), the Soviet Navy might have prevented the U.S. Navy from exercising the sort of pressure it had exercised during the crisis and would certainly at the least have constrained the Americans ability to operate with such largesse.

But these concepts were not widely recognized until late 1962, and in any case it would take a while for them to be translated into an acceptable political rationale. In the meantime, the start made during the second half of the 1950s could not be allowed to elapse; the XXIIInd Party Congress was meeting in 1961 to approve the next 5-Year Plan, and there was an immediate need for a rationale that would support continued naval development. The Americans were still, at that point, adhering to the "massive retaliation" doctrine, and it was this policy that still provided the threat. A new twist had been added however: the first nuclear ballistic missile firing submarine, the U.S.S. *George Washington*, was making its first patrol in 1961. That patrol provided a new

threat against which the Soviet Navy could plan, but more importantly it provided a new justification for new "requirements."

Recognizing that this rationale was being used by the Soviet Navy, many analysts have accepted the argument at face value and assumed that developments in the last part of the 1960s were a result of the sudden Soviet awareness of the very real threat of submarine-launched nuclear missiles coming from American SSBNs.²⁰ According to this theory, the deployment of the American SSBN changed both the nature and the magnitude of the threat that the Soviet Navy had been striving to counter since the mid-1950s, forcing it once again to revise its missions and force structure. The result of this revision was a shift to emphasizing antisubmarine warfare, starting around 1967.²¹

As opposed to that theory, the argument presented here is that the developments that became noticeable in the later 1960s would eventually have come about anyway and that the deployment of *George Washington* merely provided an additional argument in support of the continuing evolution of the Soviet Navy. There are two strong arguments against the proposition that *George Washington*'s deployment caused a major revision in Soviet naval planning. The first of these is that *George Washington* had been laid in the mid-1950s, and discussion of the FBM (Fleet Ballistic Missile) program was in the public domain by 1957. The SSBN therefore presented a threat to the Soviet Union long before 1961, and the argument that the Soviets were "surprised" is unconvincing. Moreover, the Soviets themselves had first tested submarine-launched ballistic missiles in 1955, had mounted them in both *Zulu-V* and *Golf*-class submarines by 1958, and had their own *Hotel*-class SSBN in production by 1960: the deployment of U.S.S. *George Washington* in 1961 could hardly have been that major a surprise for them. If, on the other hand, the argument is that the threat was not considered to be "real" by the political leadership until it was actually deployed, and consequently that the Soviet Navy could not react to the threat until the political leadership became concerned about it, then that suggests that the Soviet Navy had a vested interest in pointing out the threat for the political leaders, and that is quite a different case from that of the political leaders forcing the navy to change.

A second argument against the SSBN-reaction theory is that the Polaris A-1 missile that *George Washington* carried had the same 1,000-mile range as that of the AJ aircraft flying from CVs, the same range which the Soviets had *already* been using as the range

of their defensive perimeter. Consequently, while the SSBN threat may have been different in its nature, it can hardly be said to have been different in its *magnitude* from the CV threat. The weapons and platforms that did appear in the later 1960s (and which must therefore have been conceived and designed in the early 1960s) are evidence that the carrier was still the major threat. The most significant weapons to have been introduced in this period were the SS-N-7, SS-N-9, and two new SAMs. The two surface-to-surface missiles seem clearly to have been intended to be used against surface targets, the former to have been fired from *Charlie*-class submarines in trail of CV task forces and the latter from *Nanuchka*-class patrol craft. The *Kresta I* cruiser that appeared in 1967 was equipped with the same SS-N-3 missile that its predecessor, *Kynda*, had carried, and like *Kynda* seems to have been intended almost exclusively for the anticarrier role. The introduction of the two new SAMs suggests a continuing concern with air attack, which would also mean that the American carriers rather than the SSBNs were still the main concern. Finally, much has been made of the introduction of the *Hormone B* helicopter and *Bear D* aircraft as reconnaissance vehicles highly suitable for ASW work. But while ASW may have been one capability of these two aircraft, they also bridged the gap between the range of the SS-N-3 (upwards of 150nm) and the inability of those platforms that carried it (*Juliett*, *Echo II*, and *Kynda*) to be able to locate and identify targets at that range. As a result, to the extent that new weapons and platforms were designed against a threat at all, most of the new additions to the Soviet Fleet were *more* applicable to the anticarrier mission than to the anti-SSBN mission.

Overall, however, most of the developments that appeared in the Soviet Navy in the mid to late sixties seem to have been more in the way of technological follow-ons than wholly new systems designed against a wholly new threat. The second generation of nuclear submarines is a good example. The *Charlie*, *Victor*, and *Yankee* classes all appeared in 1968 and 1969, replacing the *Echo*, *November*, and *Hotel* classes respectively. Although the *Charlie* carried the new SS-N-7 missile that could be fired while still submerged, the role of these three submarines was the same as those of their first generation counterparts.

New developments in surface craft in this period (the one exception being the *Kresta I* cruiser designed for ACW) all developments in Soviet surface ships during this period strongly reflect follow-ons rather than threat responsiveness. The *Mirka* destroyer escort was the pipeline successor to the *Petya*, the two

different *Kotlin* conversions were backfits of new weapons and sensors suites onto old platforms,* and the conversion of *Krupnyy*-class destroyers (that carried the SS-N-1 antisurface missile) into the *Kanin*-class destroyer clearly were efforts to give those ships more general purpose capability. The only substantially different surface ship of this period, in fact, was the *Moskva*-class helicopter cruiser. Called an ASW cruiser by the Soviets, these ships did in fact resemble in size and capability what the British also call ASW cruisers. However, one does not begin to build aircraft carriers by starting with a *Nimitz*** and a *Moskva* would be a logical starting place for a navy interested in moving towards having its own air cover: incremental change, after all, is more typical of Soviet planning than is radical change. In the meantime, however, *Moskva* was clearly being justified on the grounds that it could fulfill the anti-SSBN role, and therefore to a great extent it had to be designed for that role; why it was conceived and how it would be used may have been a different matter altogether. As such, *Moskva* carried ASW helicopters, sonar, and an ASW rocket launcher called the SUW-N-1 (about which more later). It was, in sum, the one (and only) platform development to enter the Soviet Fleet in the latter half of the 1960s expressly designed for antisubmarine work.

Most of all, weapon and sensor developments authorized during this period reflect technological progress rather than threat responsiveness. The SS-N-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile was replaced by the SS-N-5 in 1963 and by the SS-N-6 in 1968 (and later by the SS-N-8 in 1972), strongly suggesting that it takes the Soviets 5 years to develop each new SLBM, without regard to missions or threats. This phenomenon may have been repeated in other types of missilery. The AS-1, AS-2, AS-3, and AS-4 for instance, were followed by the AS-5 which was to be launched from the newly designed *Badger* G. The SA-N-3 and SA-N-4 similarly represent technological follow-ons rather than new weapons for new threats, and had no real application in the anti-SSBN role. No new antiship missiles were introduced until 1969 and these—the SS-N-11 and SS-N-9—seem to have been follow-on successors to the short-range SS-N-2 and long-range

*The first conversion was the *SAM Kotlin*, backfitted with the SA-N-1 starting in 1962; the second was the *MOD Kotlin*, which was fitted with a helo deck to handle the *Hormone* B helicopter.

**U.S.S. *Nimitz* is the latest nuclear-powered carrier in the U.S. Navy, commissioned in late 1975.

SS-N-3. One final weapon system introduced during this period was the SUW-N-1, the ASW rocket launcher which appeared on the *Moskva* in 1967. But rather than being a new weapon system designed for a unique mission, this system after all was only the Army's FRAS-1 rocket launcher mounted on a ship and taken to sea.^{2 2} In all, the SS-N-7 emerged as the only qualitatively different weapon system introduced into the Soviet naval arsenal during the entire period of the latter 1960s, and that system was clearly designed for anti-CV—not anti-SSBN—work. On that basis the argument that developments that appeared in the latter half of the 1960s reflected an obsession on the part of the Soviets with the anti-SSBN mission seems valid.

In sum, the hypothesis that the Soviets turned their full attention to the SSBN upon the deployment of the U.S.S. *George Washington* in 1961, and that this strongly influenced the developments that appeared in the Soviet Navy in the latter 1960s does not stand up under scrutiny. Instead four things can be said of the Soviet Navy during this period:

(1) The predominant threat during the early 1960s, at least insofar as hardware developments suggest, was still the CVA (and not the SSBN). The SS-N-7 and SS-N-9 missiles, the continuation of the SS-N-3, the addition of an over-the-horizon search and identification system for the SS-N-3, and the introduction of two new SAM systems, all suggest that considerable effort was still being applied towards defending against the threat of carrier-launched strikes against the Soviet homeland.

(2) However, "threat" had ceased to be the most significant dynamic driving Soviet force development during the early 1960s. Instead, the Soviet system seems to have been responding more to economic and technological pressures during this period.

(3) The new ships and weapons entering the fleet in the early 1960s whetted the appetites of the Soviet Navy for more. Those ships and weapons had provided it with its first real blue-water capability since as far back as *Tsushima*. As a result, a "revolution of rising expectations" had been set in motion. As a minimum the Soviet Navy would ask for nothing less in the next budget go-around, and in all probability would ask for more. The "more" turned out to be the *Moskva* CHG, a helicopter carrier that might be capable of conducting antisubmarine operations, but that not just incidentally was also a "foot in the door" for a real sustained

blue-water capability, a capability that would at some point include the requirement for own air cover.

(4) Finally, a justification was needed for the “more.” The first deployment of the U.S.S. *George Washington* just before the XXIIInd Party Congress convened was, in this respect, a boon to the Soviet Navy. It was easily arguable that the Soviet Navy held the only hope of countering the SSBN. It would not have mattered whether a specific program was offered for how the threat would be countered or even what programs would be initiated—it only counted that the threat be recognized and the charter to cope with that threat be authorized.

Clearly, notions of professional self-image had begun to form in the minds of the leaders of the Soviet Navy, and future development would reflect the continuing evolution of those notions. The stage was set for the next—and perhaps the most important—phase in the evolution of the Soviet Navy. The period from 1961 (when professional self-image began to develop in earnest) until 1964 (when it was translated into new policies and new hardware designs) consequently marks a critical transition of the Soviet Navy from a green-water to a blue-water navy.

Fifth Phase: (1964–1969): Shift to Blue-Water Phase. It was in 1964 that the Soviet Navy shifted from a green-water, coastal defensive force to a blue-water, oceangoing navy. The shift consisted of changes in deployment and shipbuilding patterns, and in the increasing influence that the Soviet Navy’s leaders had over the allocation of resources.

The fall of Khrushchev in October 1964 had marked the end of the preceding phase, but it was Khrushchev himself who had given rise to the “need” to shift to a blue-water attitude. On 6 January 1961 Khrushchev made a speech in which he advocated a new Soviet policy “to support wars of national liberations.” At first this speech had the effect only of escalating the war of rhetoric between the Soviet Union and the United States. Two weeks later, newly inaugurated President Kennedy declared that the United States was prepared to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe” anywhere around the world.²³ The United States would no longer hunker down behind its nuclear shield, but would meet and contest the Soviet Union wherever and with whatever was necessary. Within 3 months there was ample evidence that Kennedy was serious; he

had overtly threatened conventional military intervention in Laos, had approved a proxy invasion of Cuba, and had urged a large-scale buildup in the American conventional arms.²⁴ By midsummer of 1961 Kennedy had also called up military reservists over the Berlin aide-mémoire crisis,²⁵ had again stepped up the projected level of American conventional armaments,²⁶ and had shown the supposed "missile gap" to be a figment of Khrushchevian rhetoric. By late 1962 the Cuban Missile Crisis had taught the Soviets a direct lesson on the efficacy of having relevant and proximate military forces in any location where they proposed to become involved. Khrushchev's objective of exporting communism had apparently been stymied by the American stance (and by the American Navy which was able to thwart Soviet attempts to provide active support to overseas areas).

Many scholars now take the Cuban Missile Crisis as marking the end of the cold war, and the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of August 1963 as the beginning of a spirit of accommodation between the two superpowers.²⁷ As was noted in the discussion concerning the preceding phase, it does now seem likely that a substantial reappraisal of Soviet foreign policy was in progress in the period immediately following the 1962 missile crisis. When Khrushchev was displaced as Premier in October 1964, his bombastic and impulsive style was gone, replaced by the more conservative and pragmatic mechanism of collective leadership. But the underlying factors of Russian national psyche and geostrategic considerations were not changed. A statement by First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in September 1965 tends to confirm this point: "We are striving to make our diplomacy active and thrusting, while at the same time showing flexibility and circumspection."²⁸ There would be no major changes in the general direction of Soviet foreign policy. The words of Khrushchev that indicated that foreign policy would focus on supporting Third World nations would still be a guidepost; the style had changed, but not the objectives. Final confirmation of this came when "supporting national liberation movements" was written into the official list of tasks of Soviet foreign policy in March 1966 by the XXIIIrd Party Congress of the CPSU. These tasks thus became four:

- (1) To secure, together with the other Socialist countries, favorable conditions for the building of socialism and communism;
- (2) To strengthen the unity and solidarity of the Socialist countries, their friendship and brotherhood;

(3) To support the national-liberation movement and to effect all-around cooperation with the young, developing countries.

(4) Consistently to uphold the principle of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems, to offer decisive resistance to the aggressive forces of imperialism, and to save mankind from a new world war.^{2 9}

To summarize through the rhetoric, the Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives were to be defense of the homeland, alliance with bloc members, support for national liberation movements, and strategic deterrence. It was within each of these four foreign policy goals that the Soviet Navy would have to carve out a role for itself, but overall it seems clear (as it must have to Soviet naval leaders at the time) that an "active and thrusting foreign policy" implied an expanded navy capable of operating in the farthest reaches of the world's oceans for sustained periods under its own air cover. And it was this drumbeat to which the Soviet Navy proceeded to march in the mid-1960s as it looked to the future and began to develop operating policies upon which to conceive and design the ships and weapons that would start appearing around 1970.

In addition to the preferences of the party leadership, the distinctive perspectives of the defense establishment and the naval leadership began to take on added significance during this period. Unlike political leaders who tended to include economic considerations in their thinking, members of the Soviet Defense Establishment tended to respond entirely to threats they perceived in the international arena. Three threats were posed to the Soviet Defense Establishment during this time. The first concern was the effort to catch up to the United States in strategic weaponry. The second was the deployment in 1964 of the 1,500-mile ranged Polaris A-3 missile. Whereas the Polaris A-1 missile had not extended the potential 1,000-mile striking radius of American strategic assets, the Poseidon did upset the Soviet planning base, and by causing the Soviets to rethink their defense techniques threw the door open to new ideas. The third concern of the Soviet Defense Establishment was the People's Republic of China. The likelihood of conflict that had existed since the rift began around 1960 took on a more ominous nature with the detonation of the PRC's first nuclear weapon in October 1964, and forced the Soviet Defense Establishment to think sensibly about the possibility of warfare along its eastern border.

All three of these perceived threats had implications for the Soviet Navy. The first two offered opportunity to operate in the limelight by directly participating in the nation's major defense effort. In the case of strategic weapons, heavy emphasis on SSBNs—building them, deploying them, and protecting them—would bring the Soviet Navy directly into line with the rest of the defense establishment. The *Yankee*-class submarine that appeared in 1969 was undoubtedly authorized early in this period (if not sooner) while *Hotel*-class SSBNs were also converted to carry the new longer-range SS-N-6 missile. The notion of designing (or at least justifying) other portions of the fleet in terms of protecting those SSBNs also probably occurred relatively early in this period: it is, after all, much better to justify forces with arguments that are easily understood, that appeal to the general instincts of higher echelons, and that correspond closely with what others are doing. The second threat—the A-3 missile equipped SSBN—was one that the Soviet Navy not only could but was probably expected to counter. It had already offered to do so in making its case for *Moskva*, and could hardly back away (indeed, it would not have wanted to) just because the threat was now considerably expanded in range. Instead, more than ever the Soviet Navy could now make its case for new hardware—even for forward deployment—based on the argument that it was the main branch of the armed forces (in fact the only one) with which to counter the American SSBN.

If the Soviet Navy could respond directly to the first two threats bothering the Defense Ministry, the threat posed by the PRC was a different matter. There was nothing effective or even very relevant that the Soviet Navy could offer to do about the PRC threat, and any concentration on that threat would tend to play into the hands of the other armed forces, especially the Soviet Ground Forces.

The perspectives of the Soviet naval leadership also became more important during this period. This distinctively naval perspective developed relatively slowly, beginning in the mid-1950s. It received a strong boost with the platforms that were delivered in the early 1960s. The *Kyndas*, *Kashins*, nuclear submarines, and *Blinder* aircraft decidedly gave the Soviet Navy a “new look,” the look (if not yet the true substance) of a modern first-class navy. More importantly, however, these new accoutrements only whetted the appetite of the Soviet Navy for more: more platforms, more weapons, and more political clout with which to obtain and use them. It is this expanding spiral of capabilities and aspirations that has been referred to as a gathering

“professional self-image,”³⁰ and it was this concept that induced the leaders of the Soviet Navy to think in terms *not only* of what was good for the Soviet Union (which it unquestionably did) but also of what was good for the Soviet Navy as an institution.

Without the navy’s developing sense of professional self-image, the inertial aspects of the Soviet political and economic system would have tended to keep bringing into the Soviet arsenal ships of virtually the same design capabilities as previous vintages. The perspective of the Soviet Navy itself, then, seems to have acted as the external stimulus which caused a redirecting of the ship-building programs towards ones more in consonance with the requirements of a blue-water, oceangoing, general-purpose fleet. The navy was able to advance its own ideas on what sort of craft it wanted primarily because during the decade since Admiral Gorshkov had taken over command of the Soviet Navy he had come to understand better how to go about playing the sort of political “games” required in order to move towards one’s organizational goals. Such games included focusing on those threats that offered to expand one’s own capabilities, linking organizational goals to national ambitions (even ones as general as “prestige”), catering to specific objectives of national political leaders, and educating the members of one’s own organization in the arguments to be used to further the organization’s goals. The measure of success that Gorshkov enjoyed was reflected in the units which began to appear in the latter part of this transition period.

If the Soviet Navy were to move in the direction of becoming a more general-purpose navy, it was essential that it develop a rationale (or combination of rationales) more generalized than just defending against American attack from the sea. It would need a comprehensive explanation of certain “missions” that it could be expected to execute in the pursuance of national interests, and it was necessary that these missions be sufficiently broad or diverse that they would allow the Soviet Navy a great deal of latitude in designing and deploying new fleet units. Thus it was that the Soviet Navy developed at this point not one but two major new “missions” that it would offer to perform for the country. With respect to the Soviet Defense Establishment, the Navy would take on two of the three problems that most beset it. The Navy’s program in this regard would be to pour resources into the building of more and better SSBNs to help in the effort to catch up with the United States in strategic weaponry, and it would pursue programs that offered to counter or neutralize the

now-expanded American SSBN threat. But these strategic missions would not necessarily result in the sort of general-purpose navy that Gorshkov and others wanted. Gorshkov therefore began to develop a more broadly based rationale for maintaining and improving the Soviet Navy, one focusing on "the support of state interests," tying the future of at least one part of the Soviet Navy—the surface fleet—to the generalized foreign policy goal of supporting national liberation movements.

The first evidence that a conscious decision had been taken to tie the Soviet Navy to the new "active and thrusting" foreign policy came when Admiral Gorshkov abruptly ordered the Soviet Fleet to "sail upon the world's oceans" in 1964. In response to this order the Soviet Navy first established a presence in the Mediterranean Sea, which sea had in essence been a private American-NATO area for 15 years. Other out-of-area operations were added over the course of the next 6 years, supplemented by occasional transits to distant points. In all, since 1964, the Soviet Navy has increased its out-of-area operations tenfold.³¹ Although by far the greatest proportion of these out-of-area operations since 1964 have been in the Mediterranean, the Soviet Navy has also expanded its permanent out-of-area patrol stations to include the Indian Ocean (in 1968) and the so-called "Hump of Africa" station off Conakry (in 1970). In addition to these permanent stations, the Soviet Navy has also made such periodic deployments as the transits to Cuba that started in 1969 and the circumnavigation of the Hawaiian Islands in 1971.

The purpose of these out-of-area operations is still a matter of conjecture.³² While there is little point in debating that the Soviet Mediterranean presence was to some extent responsive to the American presence there, the same case cannot be made for other patrol stations. Moreover, although the instigation of the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean coincided with the Cyprus crisis of that year, and later was substantially increased during the Arab-Israeli War in 1967, American CVA and SSBN operations had not been increased during those periods, and consequently the attempt to link Soviet deployments as being directly responsive to American operating policies falls short.³³ It seems more likely that the Soviets established a presence in the Mediterranean because the area was of strategic interest to them primarily out of self-defensive considerations, and that crises in other areas (such as the 1970 Guinea crisis) have provided the excuse for the Soviets to maintain a permanent presence, rather

than being a direct cause.* One additional point concerning the Soviet Navy's overseas posture concerns the actual operations their ships conduct while deployed. One would expect that if those ships were deployed to do something specific such as shadowing American carriers or locating American SSBNs, they would practice accordingly. Instead, Soviet out-of-area naval forces spend virtually all of their time in port or at anchorage. Moreover, the actual types of ships deployed are in many respects ill-suited for active combative operations. The few ships on the Conakry and Indian Ocean stations, for example, include smaller and older ships such as *Petyas*, LSTs, and even minesweepers, rather than more modern "frontline" ships. In all, the *fact* of the presence of the Soviet Navy rather than what individual ships do or are capable of doing seems to be the overriding criterion for the Soviets in their overseas "presence" roles.

The nature of the actual forces that the Soviets have built since 1964—and which began appearing in 1970—is also significant. These ships seem designed for general-purpose operations (which naturally includes ASW) rather than for the ASW mission. Had the *Kresta II* (1970), *Krivak* (1971), and *Kara* (1973) been built exclusively or even primarily for the ASW role against SSBNs, one would have expected considerable advances over the twin-arm army rocket launcher that was carried on the *Moskva* class as early as 1967.³⁴ Instead, these large and very impressive looking new combatant ships appear to carry little that is new or that is dedicated to the ASW mission either in the way of weapons or sensors. Naming all these ships *Bolshoy Provtivo Lodochny Korabl* or Large Antisubmarine Ships may have been at least as much a political selling point as a true description of how the ship was actually going to be used.

The appearance of oceangoing amphibious ships in the late 1960s can be traced to the same mid-1960s decision to give "balance" to the Soviet Navy. Although the Soviet Navy had some small and limited amphibious forces dating from the midfifties,** the first amphibious ship of any size was the *Alligator*-class LST,

*With respect to the 1970 Guinea crisis, Soviet ships responded during the crisis itself, but withdrew after the crisis was over. Only several months later did they return to establish a permanent presence. Much the same thing happened during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War: the greatest portion of the Soviet buildup came *after* the war, rather than during the war itself.

**The MP-2 (8 ships), MP-4 (15 ships), MP-6 (8 ships), and MP-8 (10 ships) were built in successive editions beginning in 1956, but the latest of these classes, the MP-10 dated from 1959. *Vydra* therefore seems to signal a renewed interest in this type of ship, rather than merely a continuation.

at 5,800 tons. Construction of this class began in 1965, the first one being commissioned in late 1966 and the bulk of the remainder of the 12 ships of the class entering service in 1967.^{3 5} Amphibious capabilities provide one form of the sort of "relevance" that a navy requires to support foreign policy, and thus it seems likely that the decision to build a new class of large amphibious naval vessels stemmed from the same decision taken in 1964 as did the *Kara-Krivak-Kresta* II series and the decision to "sail upon the oceans of the world."

Two other new classes of ships also appear to have resulted from decisions taken around 1964. The first fleet oiler to be built primarily for naval use since 1954, the *Boris Chilikin* class, entered service in 1971. The following year the *Primorye*-class intelligence collection ship entered service, with a size and capabilities far in excess of the previous model of AGI.* Both of these classes of ships seemed designed to support the ability of the Soviet Fleet to operate out-of-area, thus seeming to tie them to the same "sail upon the world's oceans" decisions as were other classes which appeared in the early 1970s.

On the other hand, some types of ships that appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s may have been less related to specific decisions taken around 1964 than to the normal practice of introducing new classes of submarines and smaller coastal-defense ships at routine intervals. Yet even here past patterns seem to have been broken in the mid-1960s. Where there had previously been three distinct types of coastal defense craft, (destroyer escorts: *Riga*, *Petya*, *Mirka*; escort patrol craft: *Kronstadt*, *SO-1*, *Poti*; and patrol boats: *P-6*, *Komar*, *Osa*) these three lines seem to have merged into two. The *Nanuchka*, at first glance the replacement for the *Osa*, was considerably larger, capable of limited blue-water operations, and in the new SS-N-9 had a much longer-ranged missile than was carried by the *Osa*. The *Grisha* PCE, introduced in 1972 and sized midway between the *Mirka* and the *Poti*, was capable of blue-water operations, and had considerably enhanced submarine detection capabilities over both of her predecessors.

To summarize, the many developments in the Soviet Navy that began to be observable starting around 1970 all seem to be related,

*The last new AGI was the *Okean* which had entered service in 1965. *Okean* was sized at 680 tons, while the *Primorye* was a 6,000-ton ship, clearly a substantial change in design for a ship ostensibly designed for the same mission. This dramatic size difference probably is an indication that more than just quantitative upgrading in collection and processing capabilities was included in the new *Primorye* class.

yet they do not seem to fit previous patterns. In light of the major review of foreign policy that seems to have taken place in the Soviet Union around 1964 and which finally culminated in the affirmation by the XXIIIrd Party Congress of a new foreign policy task, it was not surprising that the Soviet Navy would have been asked to assume a larger role in overseas operations. From this perspective, Gorshkov's 1964 order to "sail upon the oceans of the world" fits neatly into the overall scheme of what was happening in the Soviet Union at the time, and marks the starting point of the Soviet Navy's shift to blue water.

In a sense, this "blue-water" phase in the evolution of the Soviet Navy is still going on. Its most distinguishing characteristic is the developed professional self-image of the Soviet Navy, and the fact that that establishment will use almost any reasonable argument to justify the policies, hardware, and doctrines that it feels (by "drop-dead analysis"^{3 6}) are needed to fulfill that self-image. The days when the Soviet Navy was a single-purpose navy designed for and limited to defense of the borders are over. That basic function was gradually and subtly changed, tailored, and expanded until it had come to include strategic deterrence and support of foreign policy. The Soviet Navy itself had indeed become a general-purpose oceangoing fleet.

This phase has been followed and overlapped by one other. This sixth phase consists of those factors that have tended to constrain the imperatives of the "blue-water" phase. The eventual course of the Soviet Navy will be determined as a result of whether the institutional imperatives—or the political constraints—are dominant.

Sixth Phase: Détente, Soviet-Style (1969–1977). In the years since 1969 the Soviet Navy has been attempting to maintain its growth momentum, and trying to beat back efforts by other interests to arrest the navy's growth, to curb its ambitions, and to interdict some of the political capital it had accrued. Such interests were of three kinds: overall constraints that were being placed upon the Soviet Military Establishment as a result of policies deriving from détente and oriented towards the Soviet economy; specific demands that were increasingly being placed on the Soviet Navy by higher echelons in the Soviet Government; and organizational-bureaucratic infighting over budget allocations between the navy and the other services on the one hand and with nonmilitary interests on the other. In each case the most vulnerable part of the Soviet Navy has been the surface fleet, and

consequently most of the attention during this period has focused on the Soviet surface navy: its roles, missions, and the rationale for its continued existence.

Developments since 1968 have in one form or another been played out against the emerging background of *détente*. It is not the objective here to discuss the differing perceptions of what *détente* meant in the Soviet Union and the United States. In view of developments which resulted from the period, some have been led to doubt *détente* ever was taken seriously by the Soviets. That observation notwithstanding, it does seem clear that by the late 1960s strong imperatives were pressing the Soviet Union to seek some sort of cooling-off period during which it could overhaul its outdated and inadequate economic system. As one analyst noted,

The Soviet economy had reached a point in its development where it could not meet both the demands of the defense sector and the aspirations of the consumer except on one of two alternative conditions: either a root and branch reform of the Soviet system, or a massive importation of Western technology, capital, and in the end, management techniques.^{3 7}

Added to these internal pressures for *détente* were the initiatives being undertaken by the United States. President Nixon announced in 1969 a new policy for his country, one that suggested that the United States would no longer be playing a less overt and direct role in the affairs of the rest of the world. Furthermore, the United States was actively pursuing an agreement on strategic arms as well as on a host of other issues. It is irrelevant whether the Soviets believed that the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union could be resolved, whether they saw this period as an opportunity to consolidate gains made over the last two decades, or whether they were seeking to obtain by negotiation anything they had not been able to wrest from them by brute force. What matters is that they did negotiate, did take advantage of the opportunity to start overhauling their economy with American help, and did agree to limits on the numbers and types of strategic weapons which could be deployed. In sum, it was Soviet policy to go along with *détente*, whatever their internal motivations, and the plight of the Soviet Navy has been to live within this overall national policy while, presumably, continuing to pursue its own institutional goals.

It also seems clear that by the early 1970s the onset of détente internationally had led once again to a lively internal debate within the Soviet Union on resource allocations. The Military Establishment continued to stress the traditionally important role of heavy industry and of pipeline continuity in maintaining Soviet economic growth. One article noted:

... the growing role that heavy industry was playing in the development of the material-technical basis of the military power needed to defend the Soviet Union. Heavy industry, as before, constitutes the basis of the development of production, ... [and] assures technical progress, the development of the entire national economy, the further growth of the living standard of workers, and the economic and defense power of the country.³⁸

That it should even have been necessary to make such an argument comes as something of a surprise, and seems explainable only if faced with ongoing SALT negotiations, the forthcoming plans of the Party Central Committee, and debate on resource allocations was going on in the Soviet Union largely outside of the public view. That the writings of Admiral Gorshkov began to be published at this time further supports the idea that the Soviet Navy's building programs were coming under increased scrutiny if not outright pressure, and that the navy has recurringly been forced to justify its programs. Thus far, it seems, the Soviet Navy has been reasonably successful in doing so, but whether it can continue its growth momentum in the face of demands from other sectors of the economy and fend off the increased scrutiny by—and probably opposition from within—the Soviet Defense Establishment, is a matter that yet remains to be seen.

The one critical development during this period has been the appearance of the first of the *Kuril*-class CVSGs, the *Kiev*. *Kiev* has been variously described by Western observers as having as its primary mission ASW, ACW, intervention, command and control, and support of foreign policy. Most likely, it has all of these capabilities, and was designed for *all* of them rather than for any distinct one above the others: it is, in short, a general-purpose ship, and we are doing it and ourselves an injustice by thinking of it solely in terms of having one primary mission.

What is of more interest is how the ship came to be at all. Such a larger (more than twice the displacement of any other Soviet naval ship and different (carries VTOL—Vertical Take Off and

Landing—aircraft rather than helicopters) ship does not “just appear” in the Soviet system. As such, the *Kiev* has confounded most of the existing models of how and why the Soviet Navy is conceived, designed, built, and operated. Resolution of the question of just how *Kiev* came to be and what it means for the future will consequently go far in providing a badly needed measure of understanding of the dynamics by which the Soviet Navy as a whole evolves.

Because of the dramatic difference between *Kiev* and all other new types of ships of the Soviet Navy, it is not unexpected that *Kiev* took considerably longer than most other more standard ship types to design and build. It is likely then that the *Kiev* concept was formulated in the 1964-1968 period, the same period during which, as has been noted, *Kresta II*, *Krivak*, *Kara*, and other types of naval vessels were conceived. This being the case, the rationale that applied for the other new general-purpose ships that began appearing as early as 1970 probably also applies for *Kiev*. By this evaluation, *Kiev* is a general-purpose, blue-water, multimissioned ship designed to fit into a Soviet surface fleet being designed for generalized operations from peacetime presence through crisis management through coercive diplomacy and even limited conventional warfare. Beyond that, *Kiev* also has use in general war, primarily in support of Soviet SSBNs but conceivably in a wide variety of roles.

For several reasons, then, it is important to recognize *Kiev* as a general purpose ship rather than as a ship designed around a discrete mission. For one thing, the costs of building *Kiev* were undoubtedly high not only in financial terms but in organizational terms, as it almost certainly supplanted several other pet projects of entrenched interests. For that reason, it was to be expected that *Kiev* would have been designed so as to appease these various interests: in short, *Kiev* had to be all things to all interests. A second salient point is that ships seldom are used for the purposes for which they are designed. Correspondingly, the fact that *Kiev* can accomplish many specific tasks *ipso facto* gives the Soviet Navy the capability to perform in a general-purpose role, and consequently it is predictable that that is exactly what will happen in the future. A third important aspect of *Kiev* is that its broad array of capabilities gives it the ability to *do something effective* once it has arrived in a potential use area. It can provide air cover for amphibious forces, strike inland against selected targets, conduct its own reconnaissance, provide on-the-scene command and control, and conceivably even be used as a commando carrier,

all the while carrying its own ASW, ACW, and AAW capability. *Kiev*, in short, represents the fulfillment of the Soviet Navy's decades-old notions of professional self-image, and the gold glitter on her sides and the hoopla with which her arrival has been greeted* are further attestations to the fact.

Other than the introduction of *Kiev* in 1975, there have been no dramatically new developments in the Soviet Navy since 1970. As was discussed earlier, most of the platforms and weapons of the post-1970 period can be traced to decisions made around 1964-1965. By 1973, an updated version of the SS-N-2 was being fitted onto several of the relatively older *Kashins* and *Kildens*, giving those ships an antisurface capability they had previously lacked. These backfit programs have proceeded rather slowly, and there seems not to be any urgency about outfitting surface ships with line-of-sight surface-to-surface missiles. The introduction of the *Backfire* has apparently made many of the older *Bears*, *Badgers*, and *Blinders* available for adaptation, and during the early 1970s these have all undergone extensive conversions that made them capable of activities ranging from various types of reconnaissance (*Badger* H, J, and K; *Blinder* C) to antisubmarine warfare (*Bear* F).

The submarine program, however, seems to have entered into a period of some confusion. The *Papa* SSGN, *Alpha* SSN, and *Delta* SSBN that first appeared in 1971 and 1972 (and probably therefore were the result of decisions made during the period in which the Soviet Navy shifted to blue-water thinking) were the follow-ons to the *Charlie*, *Victor*, and *Yankee* classes respectively. But in a break with past patterns the *Papa* followed the *Charlie* by only 5 years (as opposed to the normal 7), the *Alpha* followed the *Victor* by less than 4 years, and the *Delta* followed the *Yankee* by only 3 years. In another departure from previous practice, the *Papa* and *Alpha* classes did not enter the fleet—or even, in the case of *Alpha*, enter full production—after the first ships of the class were delivered. The exact reason for this break with past patterns has not been adequately explained. One widely accepted thesis is that the general-purpose nuclear-propelled submarine pipelines were slowed in order to provide for the dedication of funds and

**Kiev* is the first Soviet naval ship to be commissioned with the specific name (a name which is written large in gold gilt on her sides and stern), and to appear on the cover of *Morskoy Sbornik*. Beyond these tangibles is the general pride which Soviet naval officers have reportedly exhibited when discussing their navy's "carrier."

effort towards the SSBNs.* This thesis would seem logical except that in the late 1960s the Soviets came out with a new conventionally powered class of submarine, the *Bravo* class. Only four *Bravos* were built, but that class led to the *Tango* class in 1973. It may be possible that some sort of a debate has been going on within the Soviet system about the cost of nuclear-powered general-purpose submarines that has resulted in a shift towards SSBNs on the one hand, and the much lower costing conventionally powered general-purpose submarines for strictly defensive purposes on the other.

A debate regarding production costs could also force a change in the mission structure of the Soviet Navy. If, for example, the leaders of the Soviet Navy preferred to see resources put into the surface fleet (with which the better to support foreign policy) even at the cost of trading off some war capability, then it would make sense to find a more efficient means of conducting ACW. Relegating this mission to submarines and strike aircraft would make good economic sense; but it then makes even more economical sense to rely on conventional rather than nuclear-powered submarines. If such a debate has been going on it is likely that it began around 1970—as one *Papa* and *Alpha* were completed but neither entered series production.

Since the beginning of the 1970s the “front” for Soviet naval policy seems to have been political. And the major visible weapon that has been used on this front is the printed word, primarily in the form of the writings of Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov. The Soviet Navy’s leader has written many articles and finally, in 1975, a book. While Gorshkov has from time to time addressed fighting qualities which he feels the navy should have, he seems more intent on justifying the Soviet Navy as a whole and in laying out the rationale for continual development than in matters of tactics, doctrine, or even operating policies. Partly as a result of this preoccupation with political issues, Soviet deployment posture and operating doctrine have been largely unchanged since the turn of the decade, despite the new and different capabilities that the fleet has acquired since that time.

*Other reasons that have been offered for this phenomenon include speculations that a new prototype philosophy has been adopted in the Soviet Union, that mechanical problems have been encountered with newer classes of nuclear-powered submarines, that a new mode of propulsion is being developed for them, and that bureaucratic or political problems of some sort have arisen that have resulted in a restriction on continuing to full-scale production.

The overseas posture of the Soviet Navy is essentially unchanged from what it was at the start of the 1970s. The experience in Egypt seems to have sobered Soviet efforts to establish a chain of overseas bases but has not altogether eliminated such efforts. Admiral Gorshkov has been making his case for the types of forces necessary to support a forward-deployed posture, albeit (thus far at least) with relatively little apparent success. In the meantime, highly capable naval ships and strike aircraft have entered fleet service since 1970, largely reflecting the building programs decided upon in the mid-1960s. Yet these new assets seem not to have changed operating patterns and policies as they were practiced in the latter half of the 1960s. The Soviet Navy is today a force capable of conducting a wide range of operations in many portions of the globe under many different conditions. But for the most part it has remained a potential force rather than an active one. It remains to be seen whether *Kiev* and its sister ships will result in the long expected change in Soviet naval doctrine, and whether the growth momentum of the Soviet Fleet will continue, or whether it will have spent itself and fall victim to efforts at economy and bureaucratic sniping.

Summary. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Navy has risen to a level of respect and credibility in world affairs. Despite several changes in political administration, foreign policy techniques, and overall national objectives, the Soviet Navy has continued to grow with remarkable consistency. It has been able to do so largely because it was able to appeal to particular fears or interests of the moment, but also in no small part because of the political adeptness of its leader throughout most of that period, Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov.

The Soviet Navy grew in stages through at least five fairly distinct phases. During the first stage it satisfied Stalin's need for an outlet for heavy industrial production, and for a means of protecting his country on its maritime borders. But it also fit well with his personal desires in favor of a blue-water navy. Later, the Soviet Navy was able to promise to counter at least one aspect of a threat posed by the American "Massive Retaliation" policy: that of airstrikes flying from CVAs against Soviet territory. Still later it was able to offer to counter American SSBNs and to build, operate, and protect the Soviet Union's own SSBN force. Through each of these phases the Soviet Navy benefited from technological progress and from the bureaucratic nature of the Soviet economic

system that tended to lock into perpetuity its major building programs.

By 1964, the Soviet Navy had reached a crossroads. Among other things, the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev and the foreign policy review that followed opened the door to innovative new programs and policies. One of the more innovative of these (judging from results) was a new concentration by the Soviet Navy on support of state interests as a proper and legitimate mission that it could fulfill. In addition to this was the longstanding mission of homeland defense and the somewhat newer one of SSBN operation and protection. These three major missions led to three rather separate lines of development of the Soviet Navy—SSBNs, homeland defense forces, and a blue-water fleet—although there was no reluctance to argue for any particular program in terms of more than one mission. Pervading developments during this phase was a developing sense within the Soviet Navy of what it was, what it could do, and what it wanted in the future. These factors have been referred to collectively as the growing sense of professional self-image that was further fueled by a “revolution of rising expectations” within the Soviet Navy’s high command. All of this led to new programs, most notably the impressive blue-water units that began to enter fleet service around 1970 and culminated with the delivery of *Kiev* in 1975. These new units have given the Soviet Navy for the first time the potential for being a general purpose, oceangoing navy.

Rather than operating as such, however, the Soviet Navy has since 1970 primarily been concerned with protecting the progress which it has made, with fending off bureaucratic efforts to constrain it, and with avoiding economy measures brought on by increased demands from the civilian sector of the Soviet economy. Despite the changes in the image and makeup of the Soviet Navy since 1970, little has changed in the way of employments or deployments, and doctrine developed for a very different sort of fleet still seems to be in vogue even for a navy now possessed of vastly different capabilities. The developments made by the Soviet Navy over the past 30 years have been most impressive: it now remains to be seen whether those developments have peaked out, or whether the years since 1970 merely represent a pause before another burst of activity.

CHAPTER III

MISSIONS

Missions are the activities that an institution is outfitted to perform, called upon to perform and promises to perform. Missions are important in the consideration of any navy because its notions of self-image, design concepts, construction rates, force structures, and operating doctrine all come together in its assigned missions. The questions that need to be asked about missions include: What are their priorities? What capabilities exist or are needed to discharge them? And what degree of changeability exists between missions?¹ This chapter will provide answers to these questions concerning the present-day missions of the Soviet Navy.

The baseline for Soviet naval missions will always be the role that the Soviet Navy is expected to play in the defense of the Soviet homeland against invasion or attack. Despite Admiral Gorshkov's efforts to alter this perspective to include broader concepts of supporting state interests among the Soviet Navy's missions, it still remains virtually impossible to discuss in any meaningful way the relationships between wartime and peacetime missions of the Soviet Navy before its wartime roles have been thoroughly explored. We begin, therefore, with a discussion of the existing wartime missions of the Soviet Navy.

Combat Missions. Among the many efforts undertaken to understand the priority given to Soviet naval missions, analysts have studied the allocation of the Soviet Navy's budget by ship type, operational practices, and Soviet writings. These and others all can be helpful, but no one of them alone seems broad enough to establish the priority of how the Soviets themselves perceive the missions of their navy. A better approach seems to be to ask about the order in which the Soviets perceive that their navy must be able to accomplish its missions. Using this approach, the missions of the Soviet Navy can be categorized under six broad headings:

- (1) Defense of the offshore areas
- (2) Countering enemy strategic strike systems

- (3) Sea control in SSBN operating areas
- (4) Strategic strike
- (5) Disrupting enemy sea lines of communications
- (6) Protecting friendly sea lines of communications

Mission 1: Defense of the Offshore Areas. Protecting the Soviet homeland from attack or invasion remains the sine qua non for the Soviet Navy. The large numbers of coastal defense craft such as patrol boats, minesweepers, coastal escorts, coastal submarines, and missile patrol craft that continue to be built and operated confirm that this role continues to occupy a primary place in what the national political leadership expects of the Soviet Navy. Perceiving this role to be one that concerns national survival, the Soviets feel that this coastal protection mission simply must be covered first.* The major objective of this top priority mission is to defend against invasion of the Soviet homeland. As such, the major threat is a proximate one and could consist either of short-range flanking maneuvers against the Soviet Army, or a longer-range major amphibious assault such as that the Soviet Union feared in the decade following World War II. Hence, subsumed within the notion of defending offshore areas is the ability to support the Soviet Army along its flanks, both in the sense of preventing enemy forces from outflanking the Soviet Army by sea, and of keeping open coastal sealanes by which the Army might need to be resupplied. Realistically, the Soviets have managed to neutralize this threat and consequently do not have to devote much attention to it any longer. Nevertheless, the Soviet Navy is expected always to be able to fulfill this basic mission before it turns its attention and resources to other missions that might be more in consonance with its professional self-image. One way it has dealt with this problem is by employing more efficient means than by dedicating large numbers of surface craft to the mission. Since 1965 the Soviet Navy has built fewer—if faster and more durable—patrol craft, consolidated the destroyer escort and escort patrol craft (resulting in the *Grisha*-class PCE), returned to

*There is a close approximation between this Soviet survival instinct for defense of the homeland and Maslow's "hierarchy of needs." Maslow hypothesized that each individual has a "hierarchy of needs" that lead him to satisfy urges in a definite order. The basic priority is on matters of survival and includes food and shelter. Only after these are satisfied can one concern himself with such urges as sex, cultural activities, and recreation. To the extent that he can guarantee the basic priorities he can begin to focus on other activities more to his liking (his "cultural self-image"). However, if ever the basic needs that contribute to one's survival are threatened, he is obliged to turn his attention back to those priorities.

building smaller conventional submarines (the *Tango*-class), and added a longer-range missile (the SS-N-9) to its fleet of missile boats. As a result the percentage of the Soviet Navy's budget devoted to small combatants, patrol and missile craft, and mine warfare vessels has fallen from about 12 percent to only about 6 percent, with the savings being applied elsewhere.

Mission 2: Countering Enemy Strategic Strike Systems. In a sense, this mission merely constitutes a geographical extension of the first. The major difference is in the nature of the threat to be countered. The threat in this case is an enemy's ability to strike deep into the Soviet homeland with nuclear weapons by launching aircraft from carrier decks or by missiles from submarines. Hence, there are two distinct aspects of this mission: anti-CVA, and anti-SSBN.

The Soviet approach to solving this problem has been to try to outrange potential strike platforms by gradually extending the ocean areas over which the Soviet Navy can reasonably expect to be able to deny them access. This technique was developed first in response to the CVA threat. For that threat it still has validity as carrier aircraft have a finite strike radius. But in attempting to counter the SSBN this method has not worked, primarily because the Soviets have not as yet developed any hardware capable of "denying" certain waters to American ballistic missile submarines.

Against the CVA threat the Soviet Navy originally took a three-pronged approach, concurrently developing long-range strike capabilities for their air, surface, and submarine forces.* This effort began in the mid-1950s when the role of the CVA in the American "Massive Retaliation" doctrine became evident. It culminated in the ships and weapons that entered the Soviet naval arsenal in the early 1960s.

Operational practice has suggested that the Soviets intend to execute the anti-CVA mission by means of coordinated strikes conducted against American carriers entering the Norwegian Sea, eastern Mediterranean, and northwestern Pacific Ocean. The forces designated to carry out these operations presently include the

*Since the *Kresta I* first appeared in 1967, the only long-range strike weaponry to appear on Soviet surface ships has been the SS-N-12 on the *Kiev* (and *Kiev* is clearly designed for more than just the anti-CVA mission, although potentially it has a role in that mission as well). Other changes in the Soviet Navy for the purpose of countering the American CVA threat have been the development of the underwater-launched SS-N-7 missile which was placed on the *Charlie*-class submarine, the AS-5 and AS-6 air-to-surface missiles for use on the *Badger G* and *Backfire B* respectively, and improvements in over-the-horizon identification and targeting for the long-range SS-N-3.

long-range *Badger* G and *Backfire* strike aircraft, long-range missile firing platforms including the *Juliett* and *Echo* II submarines, and the *Kynda* and *Kresta* I cruisers. Somewhere inside this assemblage of long-range shooters would be the *Charlie*-class submarines and, if war had not yet actually broken out, *Kashin* and *Kilden*-class destroyers newly converted to launch short-range surface-to-surface missiles (presumably as they depart their close-in "tattle-tail" positions from which they would be keeping longer-ranged forces advised of the CVA's position and movements).*

The Soviets seem relatively confident that they have "solved" their anti-CVA problem through this approach. As in the case of coastal defense, concentration in this area has been towards guaranteeing the successful fulfillment of this mission while seeking to economize on the resources being put into it. The decision to reduce the role of the surface force in the anti-CVA mission is the major result of this economy effort. Gorshkov reinforces this decision when he states that "Today, submarines and naval aircraft are the main arms of the forces of our Navy, and ballistic and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads are the main weapons."² He is quite clearly speaking of the role of these two types of platforms in the execution of the anti-CVA mission, for although the thrust of the entire book is to highlight the importance of the Soviet surface navy in supporting state interests, he still has to reassure his readers that the Soviet Navy will *first* ensure that the homeland can be defended against air attacks from American aircraft carriers.

The forces that have been identified as performing these first two missions can be collectively termed the Soviet "green-water navy." It is useful to differentiate those units of the Soviet Navy that *must* be maintained for coastal protection (and that thus meet the requirements of the political leadership) from those forces that the Soviet Navy would *prefer* to build because of its blue-water self-image. Another line of demarcation is the range at which Soviet strike platforms would reasonably expect to attack an American CVA task group. It is worth noting the different missions of these two subcomponents of the Soviet Navy; the operational aspects of this distinction will become clearer towards the end of this chapter.

*"Tattletails" are Soviet vessels that remain in close proximity to non-Soviet naval forces during peacetime. Their mission is to trail major groupings of foreign naval vessels, providing the "fine tuning" for the targeting of long-range weapons systems.

Although the Soviets seem to believe that they have the anti-CVA portion of this mission in hand, the same is not true for the anti-SSBN task. At first, in the early 1960s, the Soviets apparently believed they could use this same denial concept to keep American SSBNs out of waters from which they could reach the Soviet homeland with their missiles. Because the range of the Polaris A-1 missile was not any greater than the attack range of the AJ-1 aircraft onboard the carriers, this concept might have been valid at first had they been capable of denying those waters to the SSBNs. But the development in 1964 of the A-3 missile that outranged the A-1 by 500 miles seriously undermined Soviet planning for countering the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). The problem primarily was one of reconnaissance: submarines that do not have to surface are extremely difficult to locate, identify, track and—if necessary—destroy. Despite much rhetoric to the contrary over the course of the decade and a half since the A-3 missile was deployed, the Soviet Navy has not been able to accomplish much of substance in the way of being able to accomplish those tasks against the SSBNs. The continuing program of the United States to lengthen the range of its SLBMs has only further confounded Soviet efforts to cope with the threat. Polaris was followed in 1970 by the 2,500NM *Poseidon*,³ and the advent of the 4,000-mile *Trident* missile⁴ will just about put the cap on any possibility that the Soviets will be able to seek out and kill American SSBNs using surface forces.

This point warrants some development, for the broad statement that “anti-submarine warfare forces assume top priority” amongst the missions of the Soviet Navy⁵ is frequently taken to mean that under wartime conditions surface task groups of the Soviet Navy would go steaming around in the broad ocean expanses hunting American SSBNs. That simply is not the case. In fact Gorshkov spends much of his book advocating the use of surface navies for many modes of employment, especially in short-of-general-war (i.e., support of foreign policy) situations, *but never once* does he state that the Soviet surface navy will be used to seek out and sink American SSBNs. Arguments that that is his intention after all are generally built either on speculations that “security considerations” have kept him from saying so (although that does not prevent him from describing every other conceivable mode of employment), or on intricate and involved scenarios that the Soviets have not practiced and that bear little resemblance to anything Gorshkov has ever said. There is no question that Admiral Gorshkov would very much like to solve his SSBN

dilemma, but to the extent that he thinks about it he seems to have other designs than using surface forces.

There are six tactics that Gorshkov suggests for countering American SSBNs. The first of these is to destroy, using long-range missiles, the ports from which American SSBNs would deploy.⁶ The second is to improve the Soviets own SSBN use as a counterdeterrent.⁷ He also believes that long-range land-based aircraft—presumably *Bear* Fs—could be helpful in finding and attacking SSBNs, adding that

As an ever greater number of nuclear-powered submarines, above all of missile-armed submarines [SSBNs] entered the inventories of the navies of various states, and as the construction of them was widely expanded, antisubmarine warfare became the main mission of aircraft.*⁸

The three final methods of attacking the SSBN problem that Gorshkov mentions are more suggestive. The first is the development of new surveillance methods with which to find SSBNs:

The primary solution to that [SSBN] problem should not be sought in improving existing hardware, because the technical possibilities of it were approaching a maximum. It was a question of developing completely new principles of antisubmarine warfare, which also brought about new requirements for antisubmarine systems.⁹

The second is the use of SSNs in the anti-SSBN role:

(Submarines are also becoming full-fledged antisubmarine combatants, capable of detecting enemy missile-armed submarines, tracking them for a prolonged period of time, and, when necessary, attacking them.)¹⁰

The third is the disruption of the SSBN command and control systems and equipment: "Now it is possible to hinder control not only by destroying the control systems themselves, but also by effecting their electronic equipment."¹¹ Those three methods bear watching by Western analysts. Evidence of Soviet break-

*The exact translation of the last sentence from the original Russian is difficult. The phrase may only imply that anti-SSBN work is one of several major missions of aircraft (although other inflections suggest the emphasis). A third possible translation could be that "aircraft became the main instrument of antisubmarine warfare."

throughs in satellite-conducted ASW reconnaissance that could then be linked to long-range missiles,* in such submarine-quieting techniques as magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) propulsion^{1 2} for SSNs, or in operational techniques designed to disrupt U.S. command and control measures for its SSNs would each be cause for considerable U.S. alarm.

In all, the Soviet Navy has eagerly followed any course that offered to reduce the SLBM threat. But the prospect that the Soviets intend to use their oceangoing surface fleet for anti-SSBN operations is highly remote.

Why the Soviets have since 1964 called all of their surface ships including *Kiev* "antisubmarine ships" is probably to be found in the way in which forces are justified. For political reasons the name by which a type of ship is called may be as important as its actual capabilities. Would the U.S. Navy, for example, develop a new combatant ship and not include "ASW" among its primary missions? Not, presumably, if it has any hope of getting funding for that ship approved. Once it is approved and built, however, its use is not subject to the same sort of direct control by political interests, and the purposes for which it will actually be used may bear little relationship to the reasons given for its having been built in the first place.** Vincent Davis identified and described this phenomenon in "The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases":

A pro-innovation coalition seldom seeks to sell its idea in terms of new conceptions of international politics, military strategy, tactics, and so on. On the contrary the usual gambit is to *try to sell and to justify the proposed innovation as a better way to perform some well-established Navy task or mission.* [Emphasis added.]^{1 4}

Davis was examining an argument that raged in the U.S. Navy in the late 1940s, that of carrying nuclear weapons on board American aircraft carriers. But he might also have been addressing himself to Admiral Gorshkov's campaign to justify politically a

*K.J. Moore has long noted the possibility that the Soviets might try to use land-based IRBMs linked to ASW reconnaissance satellites to counter the SSBN threat.¹³

**The classic example of this phenomenon is the *Knox*-class frigate. The 46-ship class was conceived, designed, and specifically sized for a single scenario: the defense of the sealanes to Europe against the submarine threat. Once built, however, the first six ships of the class (and 21 in all) were assigned to the Pacific Fleet, and they have been used exactly as a new class of general-purpose destroyers would have been used.

modern oceangoing surface fleet in terms of the preeminent existing mission of the Soviet Navy at the time, that of ASW against the SSBN. In sum, as Harlan Ullman has argued, “the counter-Polaris task became the navy’s unquestioned *raison d’être* if only because it provided a justification for increased capabilities.”¹⁵

To summarize, the Soviet naval mission of countering enemy strategic strike systems can be broken into two parts: anti-CVA and anti-SSBN. For the first part, the green-water fleet made up of long-range strike aircraft, missile-equipped submarines, the eight surface ships with long-range missiles, and the converted *Kashins* and *Kildens* that now carry shorter-range missiles appear—to the Soviets—to suffice. But the Soviet Navy has had considerably less success in countering the SSBN threat. The sea-denial strategy that the Soviets used against the CVA threat was proven insufficient if not irrelevant against the SSBN. As a result, the Soviet Navy has turned to a “damage-limiting” approach¹⁶ by which it apparently will attempt to reduce enemy SSBN forces through the use of a variety of platforms and sensors including aircraft, SSNs, satellites, and possibly even IRBMs. In fact, the only force that they do not intend to use against the SSBN threat is their own surface navy. In all, countering the SSBN is still something the Soviet Navy would like very much to be able to do, but it has had to look elsewhere than to traditional ASW techniques to find solutions and thus far, at least, has done so without success.

Mission 3: Sea Control in SSBN Operating Areas (Pro-SSBN). The most modern of the surface forces of the Soviet Navy are charged with supporting Soviet SSBNs. Gorshkov is explicit about this: “Surface ships remain the main and frequently the only weapon supporting the deployment of the main attack forces of the Navy, the submarine.”¹⁷ The question arises why the Soviets should feel they have to protect their own SSBNs at all, when the general assumption on the part of the Americans has been that SSBNs by their very nature are virtually invulnerable. The explanation depends heavily upon the basic Russian outlook concerning security. While the American side encourages and counts upon initiative, flexibility, and resourcefulness for its margin of superiority, the Russian assumes that if he does not protect what he has (whether it is his life, his job, his homeland, or his SSBNs) sooner or later somebody is going to take it away from him. While the American’s approach is to use what he has, the Soviet’s approach is to protect what he has.

To Gorshkov, supporting SSBNs primarily means protecting them from would-be attackers and serving as on-scene command and control posts:

Diverse surface ships and aircraft are included in the inventory of our Navy in order to give combat stability to the submarines and comprehensively support them, to battle the enemy's surface and ASW forces, and to prosecute other specific missions.*18

To appreciate this mission it is necessary to understand the different types of SSBNs that need protection. The conventionally powered *Golf-I* class and the nuclear-powered *Hotel-I* class both carry the SS-N-4 and have a launch range of only about 300 nautical miles. The second edition of these two classes each carries the SS-N-5 missile with over twice the range of the SS-N-4. The *Yankee*-class carries the SS-N-6 missile with a launch range of approximately 1,500 nautical miles. The newest SSBN, the *Delta*-class, carries the SS-N-8 missile with a range that exceeds 4,000 miles. The *Delta*, then, can lurk in the Greenland or Barents Sea or in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Kuriles, and still be in position to launch against the United States, while all of the older classes would have to transit out into main ocean basins in order to reach positions within range of the North American continent.

Because the Soviets have located all of their Atlantic SSBNs in the Northern Fleet, the so-called "GIUK gap," the natural funnel formed between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom takes on special significance. If the Soviets intend to target only *Deltas* against the U.S. mainland, then it behooves their pro-SSBN forces to seal off the GIUK gap to U.S. naval forces (presumably by the use of green-water forces as described earlier) and then sanitize those waters northward of the gap to clear them of any American anti-SSBN forces. Such American forces might include long-range ASW aircraft (VP) and ASW submarines (SSNs): it is these forces that CVSG-centered task groups** would be called upon to neutralize in execution of the pro-SSBN mission. If on the

*It is interesting to note that when Gorshkov mentions that surface forces would "battle the enemy's surface and ASW forces" he is talking about the one way in which he envisions that his surface fleet would conduct ASW: preventing American SSNs from pursuing Soviet SSBNs.

**"CVSG-centered task groups" as a potential Soviet operating concept will be addressed in Chapter IV. For the present, they can be taken to consist of at least one *Kuril*-class CVSG in company with a mix of *Kara*-class cruisers and *Krivak*-class destroyers.

other hand the Soviets also intend to target *Yankees* and *Hotel* IIs against the American mainland, then units other than those already on patrol would have to be “broken out” through the GIUK gap to get to their assigned launch stations. If that were the case, the wartime role of *Kiev* would probably be to lead this breakout by neutralizing American SSN forces long enough to let the *Yankees* get free. The issue of whether the *Yankees* are to be used against targets on the U.S. mainland thus becomes a critical factor in understanding the exact nature of the pro-SSBN mission. The assumption so far has been that even with the advent of the *Delta*, the *Yankees* would continue to be targeted against the U.S. mainland. There is reason to believe that this may no longer be the case, and we will return to discuss this question further under the “Strategic Strike” mission.

It is noteworthy that under both situations just described, the Soviets would be likely to use a *Kiev* up to but not beyond the GIUK gap, and would use it primarily against American VP and SSN forces. This is significant as it would mean that *Kiev* is *not* intended to take on American CV task groups even in wartime, nor is it intended to be used as a shielding force to assist Soviet submarines in breaking out to operate against Western sea lines of communication (SLOCs), nor is it intended to operate itself against those SLOCs. The elimination of certain such potential roles for *Kiev* is important: knowing what that ship will *not* do will better prepare us to deal with its more likely wartime activities.

Mission 4: Strategic Strike: In keeping with the focus on “the strike” in Soviet military doctrine, and the concentration of long-range missiles that has characterized Soviet thinking at least since the Khrushchev era, Gorshkov has dutifully pointed out that:

All the main indicators characterizing the power of the Navy are concentrated in nuclear-powered submarines: great striking power, high mobility and concealment, and the capability to conduct combat operations on a global scale to destroy important enemy ground targets, submarines, and surface ships. That is why under present day conditions nuclear-powered submarines are the strategic resource of our armed forces.¹⁹

The Soviet Navy’s role in the strategic strike mission, by virtue of its SSBN fleet, goes hand in glove with the pro-SSBN mission

just described. However, there are three reasons for the pro-SSBN mission being listed before the strategic strike mission. One of these is that, broadly speaking, the pro-SSBN mission is more of a factor in force planning. The pro-SSBN mission has been the justification for surface ships ranging from the *Kara* and *Kresta II* up to the *Kiev* itself; in short, the ships that fulfill the Soviet Navy's professional self-image. For that reason the pro-SSBN mission carries strong emotional overtones within the Soviet Navy; however irrational it may at first seem, loss of that mission would jeopardize continued modernization and development of the fleet towards the "dream navy" that Soviet leaders envision.* A second reason for the pro-SSBN mission to be listed ahead of the strategic strike mission that it supports is that by 1975 the amount of the Soviet Navy's fiscal outlay dedicated to major surface combatants had surpassed the amount being spent on SSBNs. This suggests that the pro-SSBN mission is more important to the Soviet Navy not only in emotional terms, but also in terms of laying out cold hard cash (which represents where one's priorities really are).

The third reason for listing the pro-SSBN mission ahead of the strategic strike mission is that it may equate to the actual sequence in which the Soviets intend to carry out these two missions. The key concept here is the so-called "withholding strategy" that has received widespread attention among analysts of the Soviet Navy for the last half decade.²⁰ Although the concept is a relatively new one as applied to Soviet nuclear combat doctrine, the theory was first expounded by Thomas Schelling in *Arms and Influence*:

If they [missiles] were not so vulnerable as to have to fly instantly to target but could be withheld to deter attacks on their own population centers, they might assume rising importance as the war progressed. . . . The most successful use of the weapons, from the point of view of the countries concerned, might be to preserve them for continued deterrence.²¹

Most commentators have come to the conclusion that over the course of the last decade the role of the Soviet Navy's strategic

*For a parallel, one need only look as far as the U.S. Navy's mission of defending the sea lines of communication to Europe. That mission may or may not even be a very likely or realistic one, but that is not the point; the U.S. Navy's planners have used this mission as the major justification for a "balanced navy" (meaning in this case, a navy with diverse surface forces) and any hint that this mission might be lost consequently threatens the entire force-justification process and the professional self-image that underlies it.

force has been fundamentally changed to one of carrying out “deterrence” in war, conducting intrawar bargaining, and influencing the peace talks at the end of the war.^{2 2} The evidence for this sort of strategy in Soviet military literature is becoming quite strong.^{2 3} This strategy also makes intuitive sense as only the most desperate of military commanders would willfully choose (and less would plan) to expend all of his forces or ammunition at one time, thereby leaving himself unarmed for any subsequent operations and leaving the political leadership with no leverage with which to bargain at the end of the war. Moreover, Soviet military doctrine repeatedly stresses “1st and 2nd echelon forces,”^{2 4} suggesting that there must be something more than just the ability to strike once in any military engagement.

To date, the “withholding” controversy has focused on whether “a substantial portion of Soviet SLBMs” would be withheld during the initial strikes. The major difficulty with this question of whether some portion of Soviet SSBNs might be withheld is the command, control, and communications (C³) difficulties inherent in such a strategy. Under the best of conditions, communicating with submerged SSBNs is not easily accomplished; in the initial stages of nuclear war the effort to withhold certain missiles, release others, and perhaps retarget still others would be virtually impossible, particularly in the case of the Soviet system, not noted for its flexibility.

An alternative method of executing a withholding strategy—one that would alleviate the inherent C³ problems—would be to withhold *all* of the SLBMs. If that is the case, then the Soviet Navy would indeed be obliged to protect its SSBNs as they would otherwise become highly vulnerable to American naval forces attempting to eliminate them once the war had already started. To accomplish this, it is predictable that the Soviets would endeavor to station their SSBNs in waters where the U.S. Navy would not be free to seek them out and destroy them; hence, the development of the extremely long-range SS-N-8 SLBM, the *Delta* submarine to carry it, and the dedication of major surface combatants to the mission of protecting them.

If the *Delta*-class SSBNs are well suited to remaining in waters to which it could reasonably be expected that American naval forces could be denied access, the question arises on what the role of the shorter-ranged *Yankee*, *Hotel* and *Golf*-class ballistic missile submarines would be. There are three possibilities. One is that those forces would participate in the initial phases of the war, but would do so against discrete targets of interest primarily to the

Navy.²⁵ As Rear Admiral Isachenkov, the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy for Shipbuilding and Armaments when the *Yankee* was being developed wrote, "Ballistic rockets are basically assigned to the destruction of coastal targets such as naval bases and industrial centers."²⁶ A second possibility put forth both by Harlan Ullman²⁷ and K.J. Moore,²⁸ is that the shorter-ranged missile submarines (*Yankee*, *Hotel*, and *Golf* classes) would not be dedicated against American mainland targets but would be used in an "area saturation bombardment" role, expending their nuclear payload against selected areas of the ocean where American SSBNs might reasonably be expected to be lurking on patrol. At first glance such a tactic seems somewhat incredible, but given the widely recognized Soviet penchant to spare no expense in defending against a threat to the homeland,²⁹ their concentration on large and rather indiscriminate weapons rather than striving for pinpoint accuracy, and the fact that thus far they have devised no better counter to the SSBN threat, such a tactic is by no means out of the question.

The final—and to this analyst the most likely—possibility is that the other classes of Soviet SSBNs would be retargeted against theater targets in Western Europe, China, Japan, and American overseas bases.* If that were the case, they would not have to transit as far towards American shores during a time when they would be particularly vulnerable, would not have to break out through the GIUK gap to get within range of Western European targets, and could remain in the relatively safe waters of the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk and still be within range of Japan and much of China.** In view of this possibility, evidence that these older types of submarines have taken up patrol stations in the eastern Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, Indian Ocean or western Pacific could be particularly significant.***

*American bases such as those in Holy Loch, Rota, the Azores, Naples, Diego Garcia, Subic Bay, Guam, Yokosuka, and Pearl Harbor would fit this category.

**Some might question why the Soviets would bother to target with SLBMs areas that could be reached as well by IRBMs. The reasons include multiple methods of accomplishing the same end, the idea that the SLBMs could be withheld for a second strike force or for political bargaining leverage, and that the SLBMs would retain an element of invulnerability in wartime while land-based missiles would be highly vulnerable to enemy strikes because of known fixed-site locations and modern-day missile accuracy. In short, the Soviets might want to target SLBMs against overseas bases and adjacent land masses for the same reasons they have chosen to target SLBMs against the American mainland that can already be reached by ICBMs.

***The fact that units of the *Golf* class have already been transferred from the Northern Fleet to the Baltic Fleet supports this hypothesis.

Mission 5: Disrupting Sea Lines of Communication (Anti-SLOC). Planners in the American Defense Establishment have worried long and often about the Soviet threat to the North Atlantic SLOCs that are so important to NATO in wartime. In part this concern stems from a Mahanian concept that navies exist primarily to support ocean commerce; it also is a heritage of the experiences of both World Wars in which the German submarine menace had to be subdued before victory could be assured on the European continent. This concern with SLOC protection has now been extended to a lesser extent to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the American naval force structure has of late largely been oriented towards (and certainly justified on) the necessity to protect the SLOCs.

The validity of this planning basis rests on several key considerations. The first of these concerns the nature of the war: only if the Soviets did not launch strikes against ports, harbors, and loading facilities (in short, only in a conventional war) would SLOC interdiction at sea be valid, as the SLOCs would already be effectively interdicted by resupply ships having no facilities at which to load or unload. The second consideration involves the expected duration of the war. Only if the war were to last long enough for the United States to have to reinforce its overseas forces and allies, Soviet pressure against the SLOCs to have time to take its toll, and the American Navy to be able to overcome the anti-SLOC threat would the SLOC-protection mission be a valid one. The third consideration relates to Soviet intentions. Whether the Soviets do intend to take action against the SLOCs under wartime conditions and, if so, which SLOCs they would endeavor to interdict consequently becomes a major question to be asked about Soviet naval missions. The final consideration involves whether the Soviets possess the capability to impair the American ability to support an overseas conflict by conducting a campaign against the oceanic SLOCs.

Of these four considerations, the first two will necessarily be based on planning assumptions beyond the purviews of purely naval strategy. Of the remaining two, the answer to only the last consideration—whether the Soviet Navy possesses the capability to interdict SLOCs—seems certain. By stretching one's imagination it is possible to assert that any platform in the Soviet naval arsenal potentially could be used against the SLOCs: *Kiev*, SS-N-3 equipped surface ships, and *Backfire* aircraft included.³⁰ But as these platforms are all valuable to the Soviet Navy in both operational and psychic terms, would become highly vulnerable

once they were over open ocean areas, and are in any case dedicated—at the outset at least—to other higher priority missions, it is far more likely that the Soviets would choose to employ submarines against the SLOCs if they follow that course at all. That capability certainly does exist: the Soviets have some 335 submarines^{3 1} of which less than half are specifically dedicated to such other roles as strategic strike, anti-CV, and anti-SSBN work. More than 150 submarines, even if only conventionally powered, would certainly be capable of wreaking havoc on NATO (and other) SLOCs.

Soviet intentions are open to more doubt. There is little if anything written by officers of the Soviet Navy to indicate that they intend to use their naval forces for SLOC interdiction. One reason for this may be that holding its prestigious ships in check while conducting the major naval campaign with submarines simply does not embody the Soviet Navy's professional self-image. On the other hand, the Soviet Army seems quite positive that the Navy should focus on supporting the Army's flanks and its own lines of communications, interdicting the Western capability to reinforce the theater of operations, and turning over the bulk of its budget to the Army. The fact that the most recent edition of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* now lists SLOC interdiction ahead of anti-CVA operations may be early evidence that the Army is reasserting its preeminence in Soviet military planning. If so, the Navy may be forced to swallow the Army's preferences and face up to the anti-SLOC mission as something that it will have to do, whether it feels such a mission to be in accord with its own professional self-image or not.

At present, however, it seems clear that the Soviet Navy is putting forth almost every other conceivable mission for itself, from active all-out wartime missions to those things it can accomplish in support of state interests under conditions less than all-out war, rather than accepting the mission of interdicting sea lines of communications. As such, the anti-SLOC role must be considered to be a decidedly secondary mission of the Soviet Navy. On the other hand, the fact that for a relatively small investment of forces (forces that in fact might not be dedicated to any other mission) the Soviet Navy could seriously impair American combat potential, or, conducted differently, put tremendous pressure on America's allies.

Mission 6: Protecting Friendly Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC Defense). One final wartime mission of the Soviet Navy

that should not be overlooked is that of protecting the Soviets own lines of communications. To the extent that this would be done in direct support of the Soviet Army, the defense of their own SLOCs falls under the first priority mission discussed: that of defending the offshore areas. There is no present evidence that the Soviet Army is prepared to be transported overseas to fight. At the outset, therefore, the Soviet Army would fight only around the periphery of the Soviet Union, and could be supported over land. As it moved outward however, it would not only have to count on the Soviet Navy to protect its flanks and rear, but if overland logistics could not keep pace, the Army could come to depend to some extent on the Soviet merchant fleet to supply it, and thus on the Soviet Navy to support it.

A second way in which the Soviet Navy could come to play a role in SLOC defense would be if the Soviet Army were to conduct major flanking maneuvers. The only potential scenario for such a maneuver is in a Sino-Soviet war in which the Soviets might choose to try to outflank the Chinese rather than become involved in a long drawn out war along the Sino-Soviet border. While no major sealift capacity presently exists that could transport the Soviet Army overseas, the possibility of such a capability being fashioned relatively quickly using the merchant fleet is not inconceivable.

A corollary to the above would be that rather than using the mainline forces of the Soviet Army overseas, the Soviet Naval Infantry were employed in a flanking maneuver. Such a contingency would obviously require the direct action of the Soviet Navy and it is conceivable that it has already been called upon to prepare for such an event. The rapid construction of the unprecedentedly large *Alligator*-class LST between 1965 and 1967, the new *Ropuchka* class of LCT which appeared in 1974,^{3 2} the large number of LCUs still in service, and the possibility that the "Ekranoplan" may be used for amphibious operations all support the increasing likelihood that Soviet naval infantry could be called upon in the future to play a role in overseas wars of either all-out or limited nature.

In summary, over the course of the last decade the wartime missions of the Soviet Navy have taken on an extra dimension of being more end-use oriented, that is, sea control as a means to some other end. Those ends now include support of the Army and protection of the SSBN force, and may in the future come to include the movement of ground forces to selected theaters. Nevertheless, the Soviet Navy remains tied to certain sea-denial

functions: it must thwart invasions and it must neutralize the threat of nuclear ordnance launched from CVAs and SSBNs. To the extent that it can actively control ever greater areas of sea space it simultaneously denies those areas to potential enemies. But until it acquires for itself the ability to control sea space in the face of the American Fleet, the Soviet Navy will continue to be tied by the wishes of the political leadership to the largely defensive missions of coastal defense, anti-CVA, anti-SSBN (to whatever extent and by whatever it can accomplish that task), and even anti-SLOC.

However much Gorshkov brags about his strategic strike forces, the Soviet Navy's basic wartime mission definitely is not submarine-launched strategic nuclear strikes at the United States.³³ In fact, recent evidence now suggests strongly that the Soviet SSBN force in its entirety may have become either a second-strike force or a force mainly intended for wielding political leverage in prewar deterrence, intrawar negotiation, and postwar bargaining. The Soviet Navy has been able to convert this to its advantage by justifying virtually all of its newest surface ship programs under the pro-SSBN mission, but in doing so it may have painted itself into a corner. To get out of the corner, Gorshkov has been obliged to expand upon the potential political effect of the navy by discussing its usefulness not only in wartime but in peacetime as well. It is these "peacetime missions" of the Soviet Navy that we now turn.

Peacetime Missions. Most of any navy's history involves activities in which it is not required to fight. Hence, one cannot afford to dismiss a navy's peacetime mission as either irrelevant or too complex to be dealt with. Routine patrols, shows of force, reconnaissance operations, underway training and crisis reactions constitute by far the greatest proportion of a navy's activity. In short, while one is compelled to design and build (and thus also to justify) a navy for war, the fleet that is built will be deployed and used primarily in accordance with its peacetime missions.

"Peacetime missions" is a vague subject for several reasons. For one thing one cannot analyze "peacetime missions" in terms of hardware built or fiscal outlays made. (How would one go about designing a navy—or any other military organization for that matter—for something other than war?)* Nor can one analyze

*One is reminded of Mussolini's navy in the 1930s. Impressive maybe in appearance to the casual observer, the guns were not built to fire, and there was no ammunition for

peacetime missions in terms of "doctrine." Rhetoric before employment tends to be exceedingly vague and strewn with glittering generalities, while actual usage tends to be highly reactive to events as they unfold, often with little or no regard to the original reasons given for the ships being built in the first place nor for the actual capabilities that they possess. Nor is it easy to analyze peacetime missions in terms of results: "influence" is an exceedingly difficult commodity to measure, particularly in view of the ease and subtlety with which warships can be transposed from instruments of prestige and good will to platforms for launching deadly weapons. Finally, peacetime missions are only distant cousins of wartime missions. While war planners can consider such variables as enemies, scenarios, tempo, and geographical objectives about which reasonably concrete assumptions can be made in advance, those who would employ naval forces in support of foreign policy must work in the subtle diplomatic world of prestige, perceptions, and urgent responses. Moreover, the latter often have to operate within the constraints of fleet capabilities and readiness and deployment status that are themselves dictated by wartime considerations rather than peacetime utility.

There are three observations that can be made about a navy's peacetime missions. The first of these is that they will in virtually all cases be superimposed over wartime missions. Put differently, if a navy is incapable of fighting and, if not winning, at least invoking considerable damage or "pain" on the opposition, it will not long maintain much diplomatic influence. A second observation is that the location and substance of forward naval deployments often tend to result as much from habit and tradition as from current evaluations of the threat to be countered or the policy to be supported. The American Asiatic Squadron changed over the course of half a century into the Asiatic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, the 5th Fleet, and finally to the 7th Fleet without its continuing presence ever having been broken despite several wars, emerging and disappearing threats, and changing foreign policy objectives in the Pacific. The U.S. 6th Fleet has been a fixture in

(Continued)

them to shoot in any case. Any influence that existed lasted only up to the point at which the ships had to perform. This analogy does have other purposes than mere ridicule: while it is obviously senseless to build a navy that only has merit in situations short of war, it makes only slightly more sense to design a navy with capabilities that are, for the most part, useful against only one threat in one scenario in one type of war. The casual assumption that if one is prepared for the worst case he is prepared for all cases is hardly axiomatic.

the Mediterranean since its inception in 1946—even before it had an identity or a NATO commitment. The ritualistic NATO exercise in the Norwegian Sea^{3 4} is another example of yet a different type. Such traditional naval employment is hardly restricted to the American Fleet: the notion that a Royal naval presence had to be maintained “east of Suez” remained a kingpin of British thinking long after any real ability to support such a policy had lapsed. The parallel is more or less applicable in many other cases of tradition-bound navies, and this feature cannot be dismissed when considering the reasons for a continued Soviet naval presence in theaters in which there would seem to be no logical reason for such a presence.

The final observation about peacetime missions is that the routine employment of naval forces frequently is more in consonance with the original concepts that its uniformed leaders hold concerning its nature than with the specific technical characteristics that have been designed into the individual ships. Many analysts have noted this propensity of navies to be used for purposes and in ways quite different from the original reasons for which they were built.^{3 5} The point that they have missed is that the reasons given for building a certain type of ship with specific characteristics is, in many cases, only the justification given for the often vague notions that professional naval officers carry around in their heads about the sort of fleet they would like to have if only they could. It is these notions that I have called the naval “professional self-image,” and the process by which these notions are translated into specific design and force-level requirements—and the justification for those requirements—that I have called “drop dead analysis.” If it is true that the peacetime employment of a navy closely parallels the concepts that originally gave rise to its nature, then it is predictable that eventually warships will tend to be employed (and deployed) in ways that correspond to that navy’s professional self-image, and *will be so employed regardless of wartime missions, design capabilities, or even potential threats and likely scenarios.*

Because the challenge of the Soviet Navy is, ultimately, the way in which it will be used—in wartime or peacetime—understanding that Soviet naval practice will eventually correspond to its professional self-image provides us with an important tool for predicting the ways in which the Soviet Navy will be employed in the future. If a navy’s present and future use corresponds to the professional self-image held by its leadership, then we should be looking at what those leaders are thinking—and writing—about

what it could and should be doing. And that brings us back to Admiral Gorshkov and *Seapower of the State*.

Specific Peacetime Tasks. Gorshkov spends a substantial portion of *Seapower of the State* describing the many and varied functions that a general purpose navy can perform in what can be broadly classified as "short-of-war" situations. A review of these functions starting from those most oriented towards peacetime use suggests the varying roles in which he perceived that a navy should be capable of functioning.

Showing the flag: The official visits and calls of our warships at foreign ports are making a considerable contribution to the improvement in mutual understanding between states and peoples and to strengthening the international prestige of the Soviet Union.^{3 6}

Gaining international respect: In our warships they [the people of countries being visited] see the achievements of Soviet science, technology, and industry.^{3 7}

Supporting economic interests: [Seapower] should be regarded above all as the capability of the state to place all the ocean resources and potentials in the service of man and fully utilize them to develop the economy . . .^{3 8}

Managing crises: With the aid of navies, maritime states have attained important strategic objectives in wars, as well as in peacetime, using navies as impressive arguments in quarrels with competitors . . .^{3 9} and, as a factor for stabilizing the situations.^{4 0}

Limiting options: . . . An oceangoing Navy . . . [is] capable of resisting enemy intrigues and forcing a potential aggressor himself to cope with the problems which he seeks to impose on our country.^{4 1}

Exercising local control: . . . one cannot rule out possible attempts by one of the opposing sides to achieve control in a given theatre.^{4 2}

Operating against the shore: In local wars . . . various forms of employing a navy have been utilized: the landing of

forces [mainly Marines] from ships into the shore, the employment of carrier aircraft to support own troops, delivery of naval gunfire on shore targets, and the naval blockade with the employment of mines. The practice of providing sea- and air-lifts had also become widespread.^{4 3}

Use in local wars: Of all of the branches of the armed forces it [the Navy] is the most suited to carry out broad-scale military actions against countries situated at great distances^{4 4}

It is significant that Gorshkov spends a good deal of time admiring the political mileage that "the imperialist powers" have gotten from their navies by using them in the ways described above, although he of course faults them on their motives. Because, however, "the Soviet Navy is an instrument of a peace-loving policy and of friendship of peoples, a policy of suppressing the aggressive aspirations of imperialism, of deterring military adventures, and of decisively countering threats to the security of peoples on the part of the imperialist powers," and because "the aims of this utilization differ radically from those of the imperialism powers," the employment of the Soviet Navy in the ways described above is not only legitimate but highly desirable.^{4 5}

In furtherance of the navy's ability to support Soviet foreign policy, Gorshkov then provides his "shopping list" which, while it does not mention numbers or specific characteristics of individual ships, is quite clear on the general characteristics which a Soviet Navy designed for general purposes should have.^{4 6} These include mobility and staying power;^{4 7} transport capabilities, indigenous air cover, amphibious capabilities, and floating service forces centered around oceangoing supply ships, repair ships, and tenders.^{4 8} He also wants, naturally enough, the most modern weapons available,^{4 9} sufficient forces to prepare for all events in all theaters simultaneously,^{5 0} a "balanced" navy that is capable of performing any function on call,^{5 1} and the maintenance of a high degree of readiness by means of exercising at a more active peacetime operating tempo^{5 2} (that can, in turn, logically lead to the requirement for more platforms).*

*The U.S. Navy frequently cites commitments of its forward deployed 6th and 7th Fleets as a prima facie case for maintaining a certain minimum number of ships on the active roster.

A Blue-Water Navy to Support State Interests. It seems clear that when Gorshkov is thinking of a fleet having these sorts of characteristics in order to support foreign policy, he is thinking about something that we can refer to as a blue-water navy. In actuality the characteristics he advocates have in large measure been designed into the Soviet Fleet since the mid-1960s (although it is interesting to note that he did not, at the time, try to justify those developments by anything other than combat concepts). Staying power has been added in the form of the *Boris Chilikin* class of large fleet oilers.* The first trace of indigenous air cover has made its appearance in the form of the YAK-36 *Forger* aircraft carried by the *Kiev*. Amphibious capability has been added by the construction of the 12 *Alligator*-class LSTs and the purchase of a large number of new *Ropuchka*-class LSTs from Poland. Transport capabilities and floating service forces have been added in the form of *Lama*-class missile support ships and *Amur*-class repair ships. Nevertheless, while these specific steps have been taken, Gorshkov's more general requirements such as larger forces and a higher peacetime operating tempo have gone unfulfilled. The reason seems clear. Within the broad guidelines and political constraints imposed by the nature of the Soviet system, the Soviet Navy no doubt has considerable license to shift funds to suit its preferences, but it cannot "raid" any other service's pot to get the funds required to do more. Hence, while the Soviet Navy may be capable of reallocating rubles from one type platform to another, or converting merchant hulls into *Boris Chilikin* oilers while still on the ways, or of consolidating or slowing existing pipelines, it cannot build a larger fleet on a constant funding level. Consequently, while the Soviet Navy has been able to make *qualitative* improvements over the course of the last decade, it has had to do so at the cost of *quantitative* reductions in force levels. In addition, as in the American system, construction funds are construction funds, and cannot be reassigned to fleet operations in order to provide a higher operating tempo. The overall conclusion is that Gorshkov has built his blue-water navy in accordance with the Soviet Navy's evolving professional self-image, but he has done so at the expense of at least two other objectives that he also cherishes: size and readiness. What he is asking for now is the authority and the funding to move forward towards these objectives as well.

*How Gorshkov means to build more "mobility" into his fleet is not altogether clear, but the possibility that he has in mind the construction of one or more nuclear-powered surface warships cannot be discounted.

The concept that Gorshkov has of employing his blue-water fleet is also significant. The information he provides on the reduced viability of "fleet-against-fleet" operations suggests that he actually may be more interested in maintaining his blue-water fleet for short-of-war contingencies than in risking it against the still-superior U.S. Navy. He goes so far as to state that general engagements between fleets that once could have made a profound change in the situation at sea have now become impractical.^{5 3} Although he clearly recognizes that without a respectable navy the Soviet Union could not hope to compete with the United States, in the perceptions of the Third World, to the extent he plans to use his blue-water fleet he would do so only against naval forces of countries other than the United States, or in "safe" waters so that it can operate intact. In sum, the Soviet blue-water fleet is Gorshkov's show fleet, and seems already to have acquired a psychic value in the minds of the Soviet Navy's leaders (if not yet to the political leaders) out of all proportion to its combat capability.

Wartime and Peacetime Missions. It is virtually impossible to relate wartime with peacetime missions with respect to the relative importance each has on force planning and employment considerations. While it is true that wartime missions alone determine the way ships are built, it is exactly because of this that wartime tasks also affect the ways in which forces are justified. Still, peacetime missions contribute to the underlying notions that professional naval officers have of what a fleet should look like and how it should operate, and consequently, along with wartime missions, give rise to the ways in which the fleet will be deployed and operated.

Despite the difficulty in integrating peacetime and wartime missions in the same priority list, it may be possible to develop a theory that incorporates both types of missions, and thereby provide a device for predicting how given forces will be used under varying conditions. Throughout this discussion of Soviet naval missions we have used the terms green-water fleet and blue-water fleet to connote forces for purposes of, respectively, homeland defense and political influence. In addition to these two aspects of the Soviet Navy there is a third force: the SSBN fleet. It is possible to relate these three conceptual force groupings by viewing each as having one primary role and two supporting roles under three basic conditions of world order. The three different conditions of world order, of scenarios, that respectively correspond to the

SSBN force, green-water fleet, and blue-water fleet are: (1) all-out general war; (2) an attack against the Soviet Union; and (3) situations short of war that include naval operations from routine peacetime operations to brushfire encounters. Strategies for the employment of each force under each scenario are listed in Table I.

The employment of the SSBN force and the green-water fleet have been discussed at length in the "Wartime Missions" section, but the employment of the blue-water fleet requires some further development.

The Soviet blue-water fleet consists of general-purpose ships and submarines. It includes destroyers of the *Kotlin*, *Kashin*, *Kanin*, *Krivak* series, cruisers of the *Kresta II* and *Kara* series, and air-capable ships of the *Moskva* and *Kuril* classes. An explanation for the inclusion of *Kanin* and *Moskva* in the above list may be warranted. The *Kanin* class was the older *Krupnyy* class shorn of its SS-N-1 and equipped with an SA-N-1, 57mm antiaircraft guns, antisubmarine torpedo tubes, ASW rocket launchers, and a helicopter platform. These added capabilities have made a general purpose destroyer out of an erstwhile single-purpose hull. The same general sort of conversion was made to 16 ships of the *Kotlin*-class destroyer, making eight each into SAM-*Kotlins* and MOD-*Kotlins*. Conventional wisdom holds *Moskva* to have been developed strictly for the counter-Polaris ASW mission. However, the fact that only two were built suggests that this conclusion may

TABLE I—SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGIES UNDER VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF WORLD ORDER

Condition	SSBN Force	Green Water Fleet	Blue Water Fleet
General War	Strategic Strike ^a (Mission W-4) ^b	Control Home Waters (Mission W-1) ^b	Pro-SSBN (Mission W-3) ^b
Homeland Defense	Deter Escalation	Destroy Enemy ^a Strike Forces (Mission W-2) ^b	"Deployed Sortie"
		SLOC Prot'n/Army Support (Mission W-1, W-6) ^b	
Short-of-(U.S.- U.S.S.R.)-War	Limit Enemy Options	Provide Back-up Forces (Maintain patrols, etc.)	Support State ^a • Influence • Suasion • Intervention ^c

^a Primary Force
^b W-x Corresponding wartime mission priority (from "Wartime Missions" Section)
^c Peacetime missions (From "Peacetime Missions" Section)

be a dubious one, as two *Moskvas* could hardly be expected to cope with that threat. The most likely case is that *Moskva* was as close to an aircraft carrier as the Soviet Navy was able to come on the first try, in terms of both technical design and political acceptability. The *Moskva* then may in reality have been more in the way of a prototype for the *Kuril*-class than a class designed for a specific mission.⁵⁴ It was, in short, a foot-in-the-door for Soviet naval leaders who envisioned a blue-water, general-purpose navy on the order of the American Fleet.

One function that Gorshkov has ascribed to the blue-water fleet is that it would be used as a bargaining lever to help win the postwar political victory. This is to be done by withholding the blue-water fleet in safe waters (in which it could also be protecting SSBNs) until the end of the war is in sight, and then having it sortie to seize selected territorial objectives that the Soviet Union could then retain or bargain away in subsequent peace negotiations.⁵⁵ Gorshkov has cited the seizure of southern Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, the Ports of Korea, and the rapid penetration of Manchuria in the waning days of the war in the Pacific in August 1945 as an example of how this tactic has worked successfully in the past.⁵⁶ The withdrawal of blue-water units of the Soviet Fleet in favor of strike-capable green-water units during the tense days of the 1973 Mideast war is further evidence that this may have been the strategy which the Soviets had in mind at that time. It is this sort of strategy that I will term the "delayed sortie" strategy of the Soviet blue-water fleet to distinguish it from "withholding strategy" (which pertains to withholding SLBMs from a major strike against the United States in order to retain bargaining leverage). The concept, however, is the same. The Soviet Navy has evolved into an instrument for political leverage not only in peacetime (supporting state interests), but also in both conventional and nuclear war, against the United States or any other potential foe.

Implications of the Missions of the Soviet Navy. The survey that this chapter has made of the missions of the Soviet Navy highlights several implications for those naval planners who must deal with it. These can be addressed under the headings of wartime implications, peacetime implications, and general planning considerations.

The observer of the Soviet Navy's wartime missions is immediately struck by the limitations imposed by the geography and by the ways in which the Soviets tend to make excessively inflexible

assumptions about the threat to be countered. Geographical limitations are significant in two ways. The first of these is the overwhelming concentration of the Soviet Navy's wartime missions in the Atlantic rather than in the Pacific Ocean. The fact that three of the four Russian fleets are located in the west tends to make this too casual an observation; there is considerably more to it than that. For one thing, Moscow—and Russia—are located in the European portion of the U.S.S.R. If, as has been suggested, Soviet defense is built in concentric rings centered on Moscow, this is highly significant, for it would suggest that the Soviets still view the naval threat from the United States as more real and immediate than the Chinese threat along over 4,000 miles of common border far to the east. For another thing, if Soviet missions are primarily focused in the western theaters then the GIUK gap takes on an even greater significance. If the Soviets truly do intend to protect their *Delta*-class SSBNs in the relatively safe waters of the Barents, Greenland, and Norwegian Sea, then it would behoove them to establish a *defensive* barrier across the GIUK gap in order to preclude the entry of American naval units that might be trying to get at the Soviet SSBNs.

The second way in which the structure of Soviet naval missions establishes geographical constraints is in terms of the areas in which strikes can be launched. All of the missions assigned to the Soviet surface forces, green and blue-water forces alike, still depend on land-based air cover in order to be accomplished successfully. The role of land-based air in the strike phase is well-known and well-documented. At least until some other form of ASW reconnaissance such as SSNs or satellites become available, ASW (whether it is to be conducted against shorter-range U.S. SSBNs or as a part of the pro-SSBN mission) will continue to be a primary mission of Soviet naval aircraft. The existence of a handful of VTOL aircraft on a few *Kuril*-class ships will not change this. Because the Soviet Navy continues to rely so heavily on land-based air, the ocean areas in which it can do much that is effective in wartime continue to be highly restricted. Because the Soviet Navy will use land-based air in its strikes, the positions at which the Soviets would be likely to strike can be predicted with considerable accuracy, both as to time and place. Moreover the Soviet propensity to define exact threats that it presumes it will have to counter is another constraint on the Soviet Navy. Despite the U.S. Navy's well-established flexibility and resourcefulness in crisis situations, the Soviet Navy apparently believes that under wartime conditions the U.S. Navy would operate with a

remarkable degree of predictability. Aircraft carriers, the U.S.S.R. seems to assume, would enter the Norwegian Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, and the northwestern Pacific to strike at Soviet bases and facilities; American SSBNs would close to 1,000 miles of their targets; and American ASW forces would attempt to find and kill Soviet SSBNs in the northern seas. Against these threats Soviet naval missions and capabilities are both logical and potentially effective. But if the American side were to change the sequence of events, modify its objectives, take more indirect attack routes, or otherwise introduce a host of other variations into the situation, the highly inflexible Soviet strike plans would become confused and would lose a good measure of their potency. From a different point of view, that the Soviets need to execute operations in accordance with a fixed and preset plan strongly suggests that their movements during crises or preliminary to the outbreak of war would be a source of strong indications of exactly when and where the strikes would come, making them that much easier to avoid, confuse, or repel.

The vast capabilities of the American Navy to do something effective in affecting perceptions, intervening or interpositioning, constraining its Soviet counterpart, and influencing the outcome of crises continues to be the dominant feature in situations short of general war between the United States and the Soviet Union. These capabilities largely reside in the potent American aircraft carriers that are a part of both of the two forward-deployed fleets and in the amphibious projection forces that operate for a good portion of each year in the Caribbean. Nothing that the Soviet Fleet now possesses even remotely approximates the mobility, availability, or potency of these aspects of American naval power. As a result, there still is neither anything effective, short of war, that the Soviet Navy can do to affect a crisis, nor anything that it can do to stop the American Navy from doing as it pleases. Initiative—getting there the firstest with the relevant and usable force—is still the key to gaining the upper hand, determining what the outcome can and should be,* and then taking steps to urge that outcome along in a crisis. American carriers and amphibious forces combined with its forward deployment and its sophisticated worldwide command, control, and communications systems

*James McConnell has suggested that whatever the status quo is determines the outcome of a crisis. The argument made here takes this one step further. The force that arrives the "firstest" can thereby establish a degree of stability that to some extent determines what the status quo is and thus what the outcome will be.

provide the U.S. Navy with the ability to seize and hold the initiative. The Soviet Navy still has a long way to go before it will be able to reverse that situation.

CHAPTER IV

PROSPECTS

Predicting the future of the Soviet Navy has never been easy. Indeed, it has been difficult enough trying to understand what has transpired in the past. Yet this study of the context, doctrine, evolution and missions of the Soviet Navy would be incomplete if no attempt were made to project the trends noted into the future.

Games Navies Play. It has been suggested that whether or not a nation's foreign or defense policies change, organizations within the bureaucracy will continue to press for growth, modernization, and increased capabilities as ends in themselves. Where either the total budget or the percent of the budget dedicated to defense are open-ended, these organizational goals can exist side by side and be satisfied simultaneously. But where there is a limit on the resources available to the Defense Establishment, the nation's military services will compete for roles, missions, and percent of budget, and will strive to raise or remove the ceiling on the amount of the budget that is available to them.

For an institution to achieve its own goals, it can play any of several bureaucratic "games." The first of these games may be called "Broaden the Objectives." This game is played by taking the literal definition of the basic objective (in the Soviet case, defense of the coastal frontiers) and gradually extending it so that it gradually comes to have a much broader connotation. A related game often played by military services is called "Magnifying the Threat." This game involves either describing a quantitative increase in the threat or focusing upon a different aspect of the threat. The different nature of this threat, in turn, is then used as a case in point for justifying either higher "requirements" or a qualitatively different sort of force structure, weapons system, or other organizational goals.

A third game which organizations play may be called "Find the Mission." Missions are invariably interpreted as being in the national interest, hence a navy's ability to interpret the national interest to its own advantage will be a significant factor in the play

of this game. For this reason, the odds on a favorable outcome in "Find the Mission" will be improved if the navy concerned has been successful in the two games already described. "Find the Mission" involves competition over organizational roles and relative budget shares. Therefore, the success with which a navy plays the game directly determines the capacity of the organization to achieve its specific goals and to fulfill its professional self-image. Consequently, "Find the Mission" is often the pivotal game in the clash of bureaucratic fiefdoms, and in large measure determines a navy's vitality and growth prospects.

These games seem to have been played by the Soviet Navy since shortly after Gorshkov was elevated to the post of Commander in Chief. The methodology used in "Broaden the Objective" has been to stretch defense of the coastal frontiers from its original context of counterinvasion to include, first, anti-CV operations and, later, anti-Polaris operations. The game was played by describing in teeth-chattering detail for the ruble-controlling commissars what would happen to the Soviet Union as a result of a nuclear strike launched from aircraft carriers and SSBNs operating off Soviet coasts. It was not necessary for proponents of the Soviet Navy to manufacture such threats as they did in fact exist; it was only necessary to focus attention on the threat, and then offer solutions for countering it. That such solutions would inevitably include ships, airplanes, and submarines would help secure a more respectable as well as autonomous role for the Soviet Navy, would require an increase in the Navy's share of the defense budget, and would above all enhance its political clout was, of course, merely coincidental.

Bureaucratic "games," naval professional self-image, the extension of foreign and defense policy commitments, increased military capabilities, and the "revolution of rising expectations" (see Fig. 1) provide a model for understanding the prospects for the future of Soviet naval developments. Future developments will be addressed first in terms of what will be built and then in terms of how such hardware will be used. The chapter will conclude with some key indicators to be watched over the next few years to determine the ways in which the Soviet Navy is in fact developing.

Prospects for Soviet Naval Hardware. With the arrival of *Kiev*, the Soviet Navy has crossed a threshold in the maturation process that has been going on since World War II. That *Kiev* represents a major step in the fulfillment of the naval professional self-image is indicated by several factors:




Fig. 1—Evolutionary Process of Naval Development

Kiev was prominently displayed on the cover of *Morskoy Sbornik* upon its entry into service, and its arrival was much ballyhooed by leaders of the Soviet Navy. Although other very impressive looking ships have entered service in the past decade, from *Moskva* to *Kara*, *Kiev* is the first ship to be so treated. *Kiev* is also the first ship to be formally and publicly named by the Soviet Navy, past practice having been to specify only class name and hull number. Finally, the fact the word "*Kiev*" is written in gold letters on the ship's side, and that a naval aviation crest also in gold appears on the prow can hardly have been done to scare American SSBNs. All of this suggests that *Kiev* has been accorded a psychic value within the Soviet Navy far in excess of what has been granted to previous classes.

Kiev is the first truly general-purpose ship of the Soviet Navy. It is capable of long-range strikes against surface targets with its SS-N-12 missiles; antisubmarine warfare; command and control; reconnaissance, close air support, or even local air superiority with its VTOL aircraft; and self-defense with its close-in weapons. As such, it is useful in roles ranging from supporting Soviet SSBN deployment, engagements at sea, intervention, influencing the outcome of crises, of merely representing Soviet interests under a wide range of circumstances. The fact is that whatever it was that the *Kiev* was designed to do, and whatever arguments were offered to justify it within the Soviet political system, the existence of *Kiev* in the Soviet Fleet has provided them with capabilities that they may now be tempted to use.

Employed in conjunction with the newest of the other oceangoing classes of ships in the Soviet Navy, such as the *Krivak* destroyer and *Kara* cruiser, *Kiev* provides the nucleus of a multimission, potent naval task group. The ASW capabilities and short-ranged surface-to-air missiles of the *Krivak* and *Kara* complement the VTOL aircraft, long-range surface missiles, command and control functions and self-defense capabilities of *Kiev*. Such a task force is capable of operating virtually autonomously in the far reaches of the world's oceans (although still only for relatively short periods until logistic support capability is added). With *Kiev*, a measure of sea control over areas of the Soviet Navy's choosing has now become feasible for the Soviet Navy.

Having acquired this new capability, it can hardly be expected that it will be "enough." Instead, it will more likely only whet the appetites of Soviet naval leaders, improving their self-image, broadening their employment options, and tempting them to ask for more and better. The "Revolution of Rising Expectations" will set in to begin yet another cycle in the process of Goals—Games—Commitments—Capabilities. The prospects for the future of Soviet naval aviation therefore include larger, more modern, flush-deck platforms the size and capabilities of which might eventually resemble the American Navy's *Midway*-class aircraft carriers.

One important capability that a *Kiev-Kara-Krivak* task group would not possess is an amphibious capability. Because this is an effective use towards which control of sea areas can be put, it is predictable that Gorshkov will also want to add this capability at some point to expand still further his options in any crisis. The extensive commentary that he makes in *Seapower of the State*

concerning the advantages that navies possessing amphibious capabilities have had in the past,¹ his lengthy description of just how it has been employed, and his repeated assertion that an amphibious capability is just one more feature that a "balanced fleet" ought to possess all strongly suggest that observers can expect to see large amphibious ships—probably more than just LSTs—entering the Soviet Fleet within the next decade.

Another aspect of the fleet that Gorshkov has pointed to as requiring shoring up is what the U.S. Navy refers to as the service forces: fleet oilers, tenders, and provisions ships. Gorshkov repeatedly refers to the requirement of staying power as a primary requisite of a modern navy.² He asks for "floating service forces, based on oceangoing supply ships, repair ships, and tenders;"³ but it may also be possible that in discussing "high mobility and the capability to remain for a long time in constant combat readiness in areas of probable military operations,"⁴ he is actually laying the groundwork for the introduction of nuclear power to surface ships.

The requirement to support the fleet at sea far from home bases can have another solution that Gorshkov may be tempted to pursue in the absence of or until he gets the types of ships for which he is asking. Despite the experience in Egypt, the Soviet Navy has not seemed reluctant to follow a somewhat similar course in Somalia.* On the whole, the Soviets have been willing to add foreign policy commitments for the sake of naval facilities, but not as willing to build the ships that could free them of that dependence.⁵

Finally, the Soviet Navy can be expected to continue to maintain some activity in each of the major shipbuilding production pipelines. SSBNs will be built up to and kept at levels dictated by SALT agreements. If the agreements expire there may be incremental growth in this area, but there is probably some finite level that is "enough" even in Soviet minds, and to the extent he has anything to say about it, Gorshkov will probably discourage significantly increasing the SSBN force if doing so means a resultant lowering of resources available to his blue-water fleet. The production lines for the PTH, PGG (*Nanuchka*), PCE, and conventional submarines will remain open, and the next generation in each case can be expected in the early 1980s, judging from

*It may be significant that the Somalians are already applying pressure on the Soviets to reduce their naval presence there. Another bad experience like the Egyptian one could eliminate any further Soviet attempts to build overseas bases and turn them instead towards building mobile support forces.

the intervals that have occurred between past editions. *Bears* and *Badgers* may be approaching the end of their service life by the end of the decade, and may already have been totally supplanted by the *Backfire* as the primary strike aircraft. More types of ASW aircraft will be introduced as the Soviets strive to develop any system that offers to help solve the SSBN problem.

The future of the pipelines that have produced the *Alpha* and *Papa*-class SSNs is even more unpredictable; the answer to this question may shed considerable light on the direction the Soviet Navy is going. The prognostication here is that they will keep these lines running at a reduced level, placing the resources thereby saved into the blue-water navy and possibly other types of nuclear-powered vessels. If the noise levels of the SSNs can be resolved, the *Alpha* will likely enter large-scale production as the Soviet Navy's own anti-SSBN weapon system.

The production lines that produced *Kynda* and *Kresta I* and that is now backfitting *Kildens* and *Kashins* will not close down. The likely next step would be to backfit *Kyndas*, *Kresta Is*, and possibly, by then, even *Krivaks* with newer weaponry. As regards the general-purpose fleet, follow-ons to *Krivak* and *Kara* can be anticipated starting as early as the late 1970s, while a follow-on to *Kuril* will probably not appear at least until the mid to late 1980s. The latter will depend heavily on the rapidity with which the Soviets can integrate on-board naval air with shipboard operations, and then find worthwhile functions for the *Kiev* to perform in the course of the next decade.

Prospects for Employment. How the Soviet Fleet will actually be used is more difficult to predict than how the force structure will develop. As has already been discussed, the newest ships will likely be held in relatively safe waters—meaning close to Soviet shores—even in wartime. This being the case, the smaller and older units will continue to maintain the routine forward-deployed patrol stations in such places as Conakry and the Indian Ocean. It is likely that these will be supplemented by new ships for such special occasions as crises or celebrations but their presence will not be a fixture in far-flung locations. It can also be expected that *Kuril-Kara-Krivak* groups will eventually make short deployments with the Mediterranean Escadra—probably sometime in the early 1980s—but their presence will probably not become a fixture there either, lest they become tied down to fixed commitments and thus unavailable for use in wartime or for surging during crises.

Little is presently known about the bureaucratic mechanisms by which the ships of the Soviet Navy are controlled during crises. If the American case is any example, there may be a different mechanism that operates to control naval forces during periods of heightened tension than is in effect during routine peacetime operations.* There seems reason to doubt whether the Soviet system for crisis management is that far advanced. If it is not, then the Moscow-based high command echelons of the Soviet Navy will probably direct Soviet naval ship movements during the initial stages of a crisis. In view of the extent of the bureaucratic way in which the Soviet Government conducts its business, it is likely that even if the political leaders direct the navy to participate, the navy will still retain considerable autonomy in selecting which units to use and how to deploy them. In either case, the fact that the naval hierarchy is extensively involved in directing naval forces during a crisis would lead to a consideration of factors quite different from those which the more diplomatically attuned decisionmakers in the national capital may be heeding. In crises, the Soviet naval leaders would likely have regard for:

Gaining the initiative: Initiative is largely determined by who gets there "the firstest with the mostest" in terms of relevant and usable force. Normally, in the use of naval force in crisis situations, the first relevant force on the scene seizes for itself a variety of options, while the second force to arrive is usually limited—at least at the outset—to attempting to constrain the other force.⁶ Consequently, it is predictable that if the Soviet Navy controls its own force movements even in crises, it may be tempted to inject naval forces at a very early stage, earlier perhaps than political and diplomatic considerations would otherwise permit—so as to achieve its own immediate objective of attaining the initiative for itself.

Avoiding a loss of face: Having reached at last a certain self-respect, once it commits forces into a crisis the Soviet Navy

*Under present American practice, overhauls, workups, exercises, and deployments are scheduled by the Navy itself, and follow a routine pattern. During such crises as the Indo-Pakistani war, Pueblo Incident, or 1972 North Vietnamese offensive, "surge deployments" tend to be ordered from such higher levels of the government as the WSAG, sometimes even without the knowledge—let alone the recommendation—of the highest levels of the Navy hierarchy. (Reportedly, Admiral Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations and as such a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not even learn about the orders to Task Force 74 to proceed into the Indian Ocean during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 until well after the order was sent in the name of the JCS.)

will not want to be ignored, disdained, or embarrassed, as has been the case in the past from the days of the Cuban Missile Crisis up through the 1973 Middle East war. This in turn could lead to a situation wherein the irrational world of bluffs, threats, demonstrations, and risk-taking overtakes the more rational efforts at crisis management that diplomatic interests would prefer. In such a situation, the chances of someone taking the first step across the fuzzy line that marks peace from war obviously are heightened.

Seeking to operate in the limelight: "Being in the limelight" enhances a navy's international prestige, political favor, and organizational esprit, as well as its ability to operate in accordance with the essence of the navy's professional self-image. It is therefore likely that the Soviet Navy will seek to deploy forces to areas in which the national political leadership is—or is likely soon to become—interested.

Seeking opportunities for involvement: Alternatively, the Soviet Navy may seek opportunities merely to increase existing commitments that could lead to a permanent presence. The former pattern was followed in 1970 when the naval support provided to Guinea hardened into the Conakry patrol,⁷ the latter in 1967 when a preexisting naval presence force doubled after the end of the Six-Day Arab-Israeli war.⁸ Forward deployments, once they become a fixture, are relatively easy to justify politically, but they are much harder to create in the absence of any specific commitment or any existing requirements.⁹ Nevertheless, the advantages that a permanent forward presence can provide to a navy are several: mere use tends to provide a readymade case for more forces, a naval presence can oftentimes create a perceived vested interest even if one would not otherwise exist, and prepositioned forces offer a greater opportunity of seizing the initiative in a crisis by simply being "where its at." The Soviet Navy now seems relatively fixed in key positions in the Mediterranean and off the east and west coasts of Africa, but no equivalent force exists anywhere in the Pacific. Therefore, if, in the future, the Soviet Navy seeks opportunities to establish a permanent presence, it should be expected to do so in the Pacific region, in the Bay of Bengal, or, most likely of all, in the Straits of Malacca. There are problems with the line of reasoning that suggests that the Soviet Navy is actively seeking overseas involvement. When it comes down to risking their forces, military services by their nature tend to be rather conservative. Moreover, a

stronger and more widespread presence sooner or later generates new unforeseen responsibilities and undesirable liabilities.¹⁰ The fact that no new forward-deployed stations have been established since 1971 may indicate that the Soviet Navy realizes it has all it can handle now and has demurred from increasing further its overseas deployments at least for the time being. The fact that Gorshkov makes a point of railing against foreign policy “miscalculations” and “adventurism”¹¹ suggests that he is in the forefront of the Soviet Navy’s attempt to avoid additional overseas commitments until capabilities can catch up. Thus, despite all the rhetoric, saber rattling, and high-sounding claims, it is likely that the Soviet Navy will commit ships only where it feels reasonably confident that it can do so with a minimal risk, and when there is a high probability that such a commitment will be able in some way to influence the outcome of the crisis.

The lesson seems to be that the American Navy should anticipate Soviet naval involvement in crisis situations, should expect that such involvement will include efforts to respond quickly and demonstrate resolve while at the same time striving to reduce risks and to be relevant to the specific situation. Finally, the American Navy should be alert for measures that seem to suggest that the Soviet Navy is preparing for an actual outbreak of war. In this, the classic massive preemptive scenarios are probably much less instructive than are the actions that the Soviet Navy took during the most heated days of the Yom Kippur war.*

With regard to routine operations, it seems reasonable to predict the next *Okean* exercise will be in 1980. “Out of area” operations of a short duration will likely increase, with show-the-flag missions by frontline units to Cuba and various ports in Africa being a distinct possibility. The character of the Mediterranean Escadra may change to include newer blue-water units, but in the absence of surge deployments during specific

*During the Yom Kippur war some of the Soviet Navy’s blue-water units that initially were on the scene were withdrawn to the Black Sea after the U.S. 6th Fleet arrived and things got hot. They were replaced in the eastern Mediterranean by anti-CV units capable of striking from long-range with long-range surface-to-surface missiles. It seems likely that the Soviet Navy was acting first to seize the initiative, but in the face of the large-scale American naval buildup the Soviet Navy surrendered the initiative when it became clear that the Soviet force was no match for the assembled American task force. As tensions increased, the Soviets withdrew their newest forces into the Black Sea, replacing them with units possessing a distinctively different capability, but which also were more “expendable” insofar as fulfillment of the Soviet Navy’s professional self-image was concerned.

cruises probably will not be increased in size. The Pacific basin remains thus far the least affected by Soviet naval operations, but this situation is not likely to endure indefinitely. A diplomatic port call somewhere in the Southwest Pacific is a likely prospect, and the Soviets may actively seek such opportunities as an excuse to operate—even if only for a short time—away from their normal confines in the Sea of Japan. Overall, however, significant increases in existing peacetime out-of-area patrol stations seem unlikely for the Soviet Navy.

Some Indicators to Watch. To provide a framework within which future developments in the Soviet Navy can be viewed and weighed, it might be helpful to identify several areas that warrant particular attention. Developments noted in these areas will provide significant indications of decisions that have been made in the Soviet Union that will affect the Soviet Navy.

These indicators can be broadly classified into four groups: shipbuilding developments, changes in routine out-of-area operations, changes in specific operating tactics, and political developments.

Shipbuilding. Three indicators here seem salient:

Submarines: The resolution of the question of why the *Papa* and *Alpha*-class nuclear-powered submarines have not moved towards full-scale production on the one hand, and why there has been a sudden resurgence in building conventionally powered submarines on the other, should be watched as a revealing source. If the *Papa* and *Alpha* are followed by newer classes that are also produced in minimal numbers, then it may well be that the Soviets are merely keeping the pipeline open while concentrating resources elsewhere. If follow-on classes are not introduced on the same timetable as heretofore, it may be that some sort of serious problem has developed in the SSN program, which could be either political or mechanical in its nature. But if follow-on classes are introduced, and are produced in roughly the same numbers as the *Charlie* and *Victor* classes, then either the *Papa* and *Alpha* were prototypes or a decision was made about 1970 to slow temporarily the SSN program, and to extend the life of the *Charlie* and *Victor* in order to dedicate the assets (either the rubles or the designers themselves) to other aspects of the navy. The production rates of the *Tango* may signal whether this class is envisioned as a follow-on for the *Whiskey* or the *Foxtrot*, or whether it is merely being produced to keep the Soviet Union available as a producer

of affordable submarines for Third World countries.* Whether there is a follow-on to *Tango* will indicate whether the conventional submarine shipbuilding line has reemerged as important in Soviet naval plans, or whether the *Tango* was merely built as a low-cost way of keeping Soviet conventional submarine officers gainfully employed.

Surface ships: Setting aside the question of whether follow-ons to the *Kiev*, *Kara*, and *Krivak* will occur at all (since that would be significant only if it does *not* happen), the central question about surface ships seems to be whether Admiral Gorshkov will be successful in getting the large new amphibious and service vessels for which he is asking.^{1 2} Large amphibious craft would be important to complement the capabilities of *Kiev* in providing a broad range of relevant naval options, while support ships are critical to the Soviet Navy's evolving professional self-image of being able to operate unfettered for long periods throughout the world's oceans. Failure to acquire such ships will indicate that Gorshkov has not been as successful as he would have liked, and would suggest that the political elements in the Soviet defense system still control strategic planning.

Ship Endurance: It has been pointed out that while the priorities being built into American naval ships have shifted over the years from weaponry to endurance and habitability, Soviet ships have not yet evidenced any such change.^{1 3} If the Soviets are definitely seeking the capability to operate for lengthy periods on the high seas, it should be expected that a shift in priorities will soon be forthcoming. Gorshkov several times referred to "the ability to remain at sea for a long time" as a primary attribute of naval ships,^{1 4} and he may have been thinking of endurance ship for ship as well as the endurance of the fleet as a whole.

Out of-Area Operations: Three indicators are relevant to the nature of Soviet out-of-area naval operations.

Upgrading of forward-deployed ships: Replacing the older and smaller ships that have historically filled the forward stations such as the Indian Ocean and Conakry patrols with the newest and best of the blue-water forces would be a marked step upward in efforts to wield the Soviet Navy for political purposes. At this time this does not seem likely; it is more probable that they will

*With the United States having ceased production of conventionally powered submarines, the Soviet Union is left as the only potential major supplier of submarines to the Third World.

maintain their newest and most capable surface forces close to home waters, ready to perform in the pro-SSBN role in the event of war, but also able to depart for crisis situations on short notice. Even the one-time addition of a *Kiev*, *Kara*, or *Krivak* to a forward-deployed station would be significant, for this might be a signal that there was an intention to use these main-line forces in a different fashion from that to date. In any case, it would not be surprising if *Kiev* deploys with the Mediterranean Escadra in the not too distant future (once its initial shakedown problems are solved), from which it could still be surge deployed into crisis environs if necessary.

Port visits: Patterns in Soviet ship visits to foreign ports are one of the most crucial indicators of a forthcoming commitment. In particular, any visits to new ports should be watched carefully, and any Soviet overtures for permission to make visits to Southeast Asian or South American ports should be viewed with a high degree of alertness.

Escadra operations: Two things can be said about the routine employment of the Soviet Mediterranean Escadra: it has been maintained almost entirely in the eastern end of the Mediterranean, and it has spent almost all of its time at anchor. Sorties into the western basin by main force units, or a significant increase in operating tempo would suggest that a marked change had taken place from past Soviet policy regarding the employment of this most important (to the Soviets) of the forward-deployed stations, and thus may signal a general advance in the blue-water operation of the Soviet Navy.

Operating Tactics: Eight different factors should be watched with regard to the way in which the Soviets operate their ships.

ASW: Up to this point, the Soviets do not seem to have solved their problems with American SSBNs. Gorshkov seems clearly to be hoping for some kind of technological breakthrough to solve this problem, but until it comes (if ever) the Soviets can be expected to keep plugging away in their ponderous style. Some technological breakthroughs that Gorshkov may be hoping for are the use of wing-in-ground effect (WIG) vehicles, lasers, and satellites.^{1 5} Anything that suggests that the Soviets have succeeded in making breakthroughs in these areas would be a cause for considerable concern not only to the U.S. Navy but for the entire American deterrent strategy. To the extent that the Soviet Navy itself is doing anything about the American SSBN threat, it is likely that they will do so with SSNs rather than surface vessels,

but continued efforts to practice area saturation bombardment in those waters where U.S. SSBNs might be expected to be operating should also be watched. The arrival of *Trident* into the American arsenal will vastly complicate Soviet planning, and we should be watching carefully for any changes in Soviet deployment patterns and exercise areas that follow *Trident*'s delivery.

Yankee patrol stations: One possible result of the introduction of the long-range *Deltas*, the embracement of the pro-SSBN mission, and the SLBM withholding strategy* is that older classes of Soviet SSBNs would become available for other than main-strike missions. Such other missions might include their being programmed against theater targets (Western Europe or the PRC) or being used for area saturation bombardment against the likely operating areas of American SSBNs.^{1 6} Shifts in the patrol stations of *Yankee*-class SSBNs to the eastern Atlantic or western Pacific will suggest that one of these two possibilities has been adopted.

Allocation of *Kuril* class: *Kiev*'s shift to the Northern Fleet suggests that her mission is still more war related than peace related. The remote location of the Northern Fleet at Severomorsk is the last place one would station a ship expected to respond in crises, but is the best location if that ship is intended to perform in the pro-SSBN role. However, should any of the other ships of the *Kuril* class remain with the Black Sea Fleet, one would have to question seriously just how well SSBNs (of which there are none in the Black Sea Fleet) could be defended from that location. Only two explanations would suffice: that a bureaucratic system of allocation is in effect, or that a conscious decision had been made to use a *Kiev* for short-of-war purposes even at the expense of its wartime mission. The latter case seems most probable but either would confirm that war-oriented mission tasking was no longer the sole governing factor in Soviet force employment decisions.

Use of *Kiev*: The fact that *Kiev* provides the Soviets with many options raises the question of how it will actually be employed in a crisis. It is not likely that the Soviets would feel themselves constrained against using *Kiev* in every way feasible, and a close monitoring of where, when, and for how long *Kiev* goes, and what she does when she gets there, will provide a good deal of information to observers regarding how that ship will actually be used in situations ranging from war to showing the flag. That *Kiev* has been justified as a pro-SSBN asset has not yet

*See Chapter III on wartime missions (Strategic Strike).

cleared up just how it would be used in such a role. *Kiev's* operations during *Okean 80* should be revealing in this respect.

Kiev-Kara-Krivak task group operations: The potentially complementary nature of the weapons and sensors of Soviet surface ships makes it predictable that even if the Soviets did not expressly design these ships for mutual support, they will at some point begin to operate them together as task groups. The first efforts will probably be oriented towards political ends, as in peacetime demonstrations or group port visits. But if not before, the next *Okean* exercise should find Soviet naval task groups composed of at least these three types of ships operating together. Such an occurrence should be taken as a precursor to the use of such task groups in crises, or possibly as intervention forces at a low level of conflict.

Okean 80: The next *Okean* exercise will be the first since the introduction of *Kiev*. Despite the fact that by then she will have been with the fleet for 5 years, it is likely that the exercise will mark her "coming-out" as far as the Soviet Navy is concerned. It is likely that they will want to show *Kiev* and her sister ship(s) at their best, and consequently *Okean 80* should be the best indicator of all of how *Kiev* and *Kiev*-centered task groups can be expected to operate in the 1980s.

Use of *Tango*: As was stated earlier, the *Tango*-class submarine is something of an enigma in the course of Soviet naval development. Not only the size of the production run, but the way in which *Tango* is employed will suggest whether it is intended by the Soviets as an operational unit or merely a "place-holder" in the production pipeline. Observation of the employment of *Tangos* may provide a key insight on future prospects for all SSN programs.

"Delayed sortie" strategy: Little evidence presently exists to support the hypothesis that Soviet naval strategy in wartime would be to withhold main-line surface units in home ports or safe waters and sortie them only towards the end of the conflict so as to seize and hold vital positions for the postwar peace negotiations. Yet this hypothesis has already been advanced by several analysts, albeit in a different context,¹⁷ and the deductive process in this paper has led the author to the same conclusion. Any further direct or indirect references to the advantage of such a strategy in open Soviet literature (such as Gorshkov's citing the seizure of the Sakhalins and Kuriles at the end of World War II)¹⁸ should be considered as adding credibility and support to this potential strategy within the Soviet Navy.

Political Indicators: Two political indicators are potentially fruitful in foreseeing future Soviet naval development:

Share of budget: The percent of the Soviet Union's total defense budget dedicated to the Navy has now remained constant for over 20 years.¹⁹ Any indication that the Soviet Navy's share of the defense budget is changing (either way) would be a strong signal that its role in Soviet foreign and defense planning was changing. The results of the XXVth Party Congress held in 1976 are not yet known, but it is at least possible that changes in budget allocation might have taken place during this most recent budgeting session.

Gorshkov's relief: Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov has been the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy for over 20 years. He may retire—or be retired—soon, and the experience of the man who takes his place will to some extent indicate the direction the Soviet Navy will follow in the next decade. If Gorshkov's replacement is one of "his boys," there likely will be considerable continuity with the path the Soviet Navy has followed over the last 20 years. But if his replacement comes from the fleet and has not been stationed in Moscow in the last decade or so, he will probably not know how to play the bureaucratic games with anywhere near the skill that Gorshkov has demonstrated, and his viewpoint on what the Soviet Navy needs in the future may not be the same as Gorshkov's. Finally, the specific experience of the replacement will almost certainly be significant. Whether he is from SSBNs or general-purpose submarines, the blue-water or green-water fleet, or primarily a politician or administrator will be an early indication of which aspect of the Soviet Navy may be stressed in the future.*

To summarize, facing a strong and increasing pressure from the domestic sector of the economy, the uncertain outcome of SALT negotiations, the probable imminent retirement of its leader of over 20 years, and having recently crossed a new threshold in its maturation process with the introduction of *Kiev*, the Soviet Navy is clearly at a crossroads in its development. The course it will take in the future is not known with any high degree of confidence, although we should not avoid making speculations based on the information available. To verify these speculations, 16 different indicators have been listed that bear close watching. The directions

*Every Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy since 1917 has been a surface line officer. A change from this would be highly significant.

in which these indicators point, especially when viewed in the overall context of Soviet naval development (rather than in isolation) will provide the analyst with a good picture of what lies ahead for the Soviet Navy . . . and for the West.

APPENDIX I

CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF SOVIET NAVAL SHIPS AND WEAPONS

SOVIET LARGE SURFACE COMBATANTS

Year	Type	Class	Number ^a	Still in Use ^b	Main Armament	Length	Tonnage	Remarks
1949	DD	SKORYY	75	Obso	100MM Guns	395'	3500	24 planned
1952	CA	SVERDLOV	14	Obso	152MM Guns	689'	18000	Later also conv to KILDEN, MOD-/ SAM-KOTLIN
1955	DD	KOTLIN	30	Yes	130MM Guns	425'	3885	
1958	DDSP	KILDEN	4	No	SS-N-1	425'	3885	KOTLIN-conversion 6 conv to KANINs
1959	DDSP	KRUPNYY	8	Obso	SS-N-1	452'	4650	
1962	CLGM	KYNDA	4	Yes	SS-N-3	492'	6600	
1962	DDG	KASHIN	20	Yes	SA-N-1	471'	5200	First gas turbines
1962	DDG	SAM-KOTLIN	8	Yes	SA-N-1/Guns	425'	3885	
1967	CLGM	KRESTA I	4	Yes	SS-N-3	510'	6500	Helo-equipped
1967	CHG	MOSKVA	2	Yes	Helos/SUW-N-1	645'	18000	
1968	DDG	KANIN	6	Yes	SA-N-1	456'	4600	KRUPNYY conversion
1970	CLGM	KRESTA II	8+	Yes	SS-N-10/14	520'	7500	
1971	DDG	KRIVAK	9+	Yes	SS-N-10/14 VDS	405'	5200	Gas turbines
1973	CG	KARA	3+	Yes	SS-N-10/14 VDS	650'	9500	Gas turbines
1973	DDG	MOD-KILDEN	4	Yes	SS-N-11	425'	3885	KILDEN conversion
1974	DDG	MOD-KASHIN	4+	Yes	SS-N-11	471'	5200	
1975	CVSG	KURIL	2+	Yes	VTOL A/C	925	40000	

^a"+" = Class still under construction (quantity in service in 1976 shown)

^b"Obso" = Obsolete or obsolescent

NOTE: Old NATO-type classifications have been used.

SOVIET SMALL SURFACE COMBATANTS

Year	Type	Class	Number ^a	Still in Use ^b	Main Armament	Length	Tonnage	Remarks
1948	PCE	KRONSTADT		No	Guns	171'	380	
1951	PT	P-4	192	No	Guns	63'	22	
1954	DE	KOLA	24	No	100MM Guns	295'	1500	
1956	DE	RIGA	64	Obso	100MM Guns	279'	1200	
1957	PT	P-6, P-8, P-10	80	Obso	Torps	84'	75	P-6 conv to KOMARs
1958	PCE	SO-1	80	Obso	Guns	139'	350	
1962	DE	PETYA	45	Yes	76MM Guns	270'	1150	
1962	PCE	POTI	70	Yes	Guns	194'	600	
1962	PT	SHERSHEEN	45	Obso	Torps	115'	160	Most exported
1962	PTG	OSA I	65	Yes	SS-N-2	130'	200	P-6 conversion
1965	DE	MIRKA	25	Yes	76MM Guns	270'	1100	
1966	PTH	PCHELA	25	Yes		82'	80	Hydrofoil
1967	PTG	OSA II	55	Yes	SS-N-2	130'	200	
1968	PT	STENKA	45	Yes		129'	210	OSA design
1969	PGG	NANUCHKA	12+	Yes	SS-N-9	230'	800	
1972	PCE	GRISHA	17+	Yes	57MM Guns	235'	900	ASW-oriented
1973	PTH	TURYA	12+	Yes		123'	165	

^a“+” = Class still under construction (quantity in service in 1976 shown)

^b“Obso” = Obsolete or obsolescent

NOTE: Old NATO-type classifications have been used.

SOVIET SUBMARINES

Year Introd.	Type	Class	Number	Still in Use	Main Armament	Length	Displacement	Remarks
1952	SS	ZULU	50	Obso	Torpedoes	260'	2250T	Z-IV, Z-V still in use
1956	SS	QUEBEC	50	No	Torpedoes	180'	750T	
1958	SS	FOXTROT	56	Yes	Torpedoes	300'	2280T	Improved ZULU
1954	SS	WHISKEY	182	No	Torpedoes	240'	1180T	W conver still in use
1958	SS	ROMEO	20	No	Torpedoes	246'	1600T	
1969	SS	BRAVO	4	Yes	Torpedoes	270'	2800T	
1973	SS	TANGO	(?)	Yes	Torpedoes	(unk)	1500T	
1959	SSN	NOVEMBER	14	Yes	Torpedoes	360'	4000T	1st Nuc. powered sub
1968	SSN	VICTOR	16	Yes	Torpedoes	285'	5100T	
1971(?)	SSN	ALPHA	(1)	No	Torpedoes	(unk)	4500T	Not yet in svc
1960	SSG	WHISKEY	12	Obso	SS-N-3	276'	1800T	5 "twin cylinder"; 7 "Long-Bin"
		Conversions						
1962	SSG	JULIETT	16	Yes	SS-N-3	328'	2500T	
1962	SSGN	ECHO I	4	No	SS-N-3	385'	5000T	
1963	SSGN	ECHO II	27	Yes	SS-N-3	394'	5600T	
1968	SSGN	CHARLIE	12	Yes	SS-N-7	295'	5100T	
1972	SSGN	PAPA	(?)	Yes	SS-N-7(?)	(unk)	(unk)	Not yet in svc
1956	SSB	ZULU V	6	No	SS-N-4	259'	2600T	
1958	SSB	GOLF	22	Obso	SS-N-4	310'	2700T	9 Mod to HOTEL II
1960	SSBN	HOTEL I	13	No	SS-N-4	344'	4100T	
1967	SSBN	HOTEL II	9	Obso	SS-N-5	377'	4100T	1 conv. to H-III
1969	SSBN	YANKEE	34	Yes	SS-N-6	427'	9000T	
1972	SSBN	DELTA	7	Yes	SS-N-8	(427'?)	(9000T?)	Being conv. to DELTA II, III

SOVIET NAVAL SUPPORT CRAFT

Year	Type	Class	Number	Still in Use	Main Armament	Length	Tonnage	Remarks
Amphibious Ships (Oceangoing)								
1967	LST	ALLIGATOR	12	Yes	Troops	371'	5800	
Service Ships								
1954	AO	KAGBEK	10	Obso	Fuel	447'	16230	Support ship
1957	AO(Spt)	PEVEK	4	Obso	Fuel	344'	4500	Support ship
1962	AO(Spt)	UDA	6	Yes	Fuel	400'	7200	Support ship
1969	AO(Spt)	ALTAM	6	Yes	Fuel	344'	5500	Support ship
1971	AO	CHILIKIN	3	Yes	Fuel	532'	23000	
Repair/Support Ships								
1957	AS	WILHELM BAUER	2	Obso	Workshops	446'	5600	Salvaged
1957	AS	DNEPR	5	Obso	Workshops	371'	5250	
1960	AS	DON	6	Yes	Workshops	459'	7000	
1965	AS	UGRA	10	Yes	Workshops	464'	7000	Flag-capable
1958	AR	TOVDA	1	Obso	Workshops	282'	4000	Ex-tanker
1965	AR	OSKOL	10	Yes	Workshops	295'	3000	Polish-built
1971	AR	AMUR	12	Yes	Workshops	377'	6000	
Intelligence Collectors								
1959	AGI	LENTRA	8	Obso	Sensors	143'	250	
1965	AGI	OKEAN	15	Yes	Sensors	178'	680	
1972	AGI	PRIMORYE	6	Yes	Sensors	274'	6000	

SOVIET LONG-RANGE NAVAL AVIATION

Year Introduced	Name	Mission	Main Armament	Still in Use	Remarks
1954	BISON A	Bomber	Bombs	No	
1964	BISON B	EW	Sensors	No	
1964	BISON C	Recon	Sensors	No	
1954	BADGER A	Bomber	Bombs	No	Est. 350-400 in svc 1976
1961	BADGER B	Strike	AS-1	No	
1961	BADGER C	Strike	AS-2	Obs	
1969	BADGER D/E/F	Recon	Sensors	Yes	
1969	BADGER G	Strike	AS-5	Yes	
1972	BADGER H/J/K	Recon	Sensors	Yes	
1955	BEAR A	Bomber	Bombs	No	Est. 75 BEARS in svc 1976
1961	BEAR B	Strike	AS-3	Obs	
1964	BEAR C	Strike	AS-3	Obs	
1967	BEAR D	Recon/Tgtng	Sensors	Yes	
1972	BEAR E	Bomber	Bombs	Obs	
1972	BEAR F	ASW	Sensors/Torps	Yes	OTH tgtng for L/R missiles Updated BEAR A
1961	BLINDER A	Bomber	Bombs	No	Est. 60 in svc in 1976
1961	BLINDER B	Strike	AS-4	Yes	
1973	BLINDER C	Photo Recon	Sensors	Yes	
1970	BACKFIRE A	Prototype	—	No	Est. 20 in svc in 1976
1972	BACKFIRE B	Strike	AS-6	Yes	

SOVIET NAVAL WEAPONS

Type	Year Introduced	Designation	Name	Mission	Still in Use	First Platform(s)	Remarks
ASM	1961	AS-1	KENNEL	Anti-Ship	No	BADGER B	
ASM	1961	AS-2	KIPPER	Anti-Ship	Obso	BADGER C	
ASM	1961	AS-3	KANGAROO	Anti-Ship	Obso	BEAR B/C	
ASM	1961	AS-4	KITCHEN	Strategic	Yes	BLINDER B	
ASM	1969	AS-5	KELT	Anti-Ship	Yes	BADGER G	
ASM	1970	AS-6	KERRY	Anti-Ship	Yes	BACKFIRE B	
SSM	1958	SS-N-1	SCRUBBER	Anti-Ship	No	BILDEN/KRUPNYY	
SSM	1961	SS-N-2	STYX	Anti-Ship	Yes	OSA, KOMAR	
SSM	1961	SS-N-3	SHADDOCK	Anti-Ship	Yes	E-II, J, KYNDA, KRESTA I	
SSM	1968	SS-N-7	(none)	Anti-Ship	Yes	CHARLIE	Dive-Launched
SSM	1969	SS-N-9	(none)	Anti-Ship	Yes	NANUCHKA	Updtd/Mod SS-N-2
SSM	1969	SS-N-11	(none)	Anti-Ship	Yes	MOD-KILDEN, MOD-KASHIN	
SSM	1970	SS-N-10/14	(none)	Anti-Ship/ASW	Yes	KRIVAK, KRESTA II, KARA	Undet. char. ASW missile torp. or short (29NM) range SSM
SSM	1975	SS-N-12	(none)	Anti-Ship	Yes	E-II, KURIL	
SAM	1961	SA-N-1	GOA	Anti-Air	Yes	SAM-KOTLIN, KANIN KYNDA, KASHIN	


SOVIET NAVAL WEAPONS (Cont'd)

Type	Year Introduced	Designation	Name	Mission	Still in Use	First Platform(s)	Remarks
SAM	1967	SA-N-3	GOBLET	Anti-Air	Yes	KRESTA II, MOSKVA	
SAM	1969	SA-N-4	(none)	Anti-Air	Yes	NANUCHKA, KRIVAK, KARA, KURIL	
SLBM	1958	SS-N-4	SARK	ICBM	No	ZULU V, GOLF I	First tested 1955-56
SLBM	1963	SS-N-5	SERB	ICBM	Obso	GOLF II, HOTEL II	
SLBM	1968	SS-N-6	SAWFLY	ICBM	Yes	YANKEE	
SLBM	1972	SS-N-8	(none)	ICBM	Yes	DELTA	
Gun	1948	152mm/50	—	Surface	No	SVERDLOV, CHAPAEV	
Gun	1948	100mm/50	—	Dual-Purpose	No	SVERDLOV, CHAPAEV	
Gun	1948	37mm/63	—	Anti-Air	Obso	SVERDLOV, RIGA	
Gun	1955	130mm/58	—	Dual-Purpose	Obso	KOTLIN	Semi-Auto
Gun	1955	45mm/85	—	Anti-Air	Obso	KOTLIN, KILDEN	Radar controlled
Gun	1958	57mm/70	—	Anti-Air	Obso	KRUPNYY	Enclosed
Gun	1962	76.2mm/60	—	Dual-Purpose	Yes	KYNDA, KASHIN	
Gun	1967	57mm/80	—	Twin Anti-Air	Yes	MOSKVA, KRESTA I	Fully automatic
Gun	1970	30mm	—	Point Defense	Yes	KRESTA II, KARA	Gatling variety


APPENDIX II

INTRODUCTION SEQUENCE OF SOVIET NAVAL HARDWARE


SEQUENCE OF SOVIET MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS




SEQUENCE OF SOVIET SMALL SURFACE COMBATANTS




SEQUENCE OF SOVIET SUBMARINES



SEQUENCE OF SOVIET NAVAL SUPPORT CRAFT




SEQUENCE OF SOVIET NAVAL WEAPONS



Key: Designation, NATO Name (Type)*

* For Guns Only

SEQUENCE OF SOVIET NAVAL AIRCRAFT (LONG-RANGE)



NOTES

CHAPTER I—INTRODUCTION

1. Peter Vigor, "Soviet Understanding of Command of the Sea," chap. 32 in Michael MccGwire, et al., eds., *Soviet Naval Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 607.
2. The point is a general theme in the writings of Ken Booth. See, e.g., *Navies and Foreign Policy* (New York: Crane & Russak, 1977).
3. James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 131.

CHAPTER II—EVOLUTION

1. Robert W. Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1968), p. 28.
2. The remarks were attributed by Stalin in a Navy Day address on 22 July 1945. In the same address Stalin reaffirmed that the Soviet Fleet was eventually to move out onto the world's oceans and seek Russia's release from enclosed seas and other geographic limitations. See Donald W. Mitchell, *A History of Russian and Soviet Seapower* (New York: Macmillan, 1974), p. 470.
3. Michael MccGwire, "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy," *Selected Readings in Strategy and Policy* (Newport, R.I.: U.S. Naval War College, 1976), p. 119.
4. George Kennan, as quoted by H.D. Felt, "The Potential of Our Nuclear Age Navy," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, January 1958, p. 111.
5. One such was James V. Forrestal. An interesting entry found in his diaries was: "I find that whenever any American suggests that we act in accordance with the needs of our own security he is apt to be called a god-damned fascist or imperialist, while if Uncle Joe suggests that he needs the Baltic Provinces, half of Poland, all of Bessarabia and access to the Med, all hands agree that he is a fine, frank, candid, and generally delightful fellow who is easy to deal with because he is so explicit in what he wants." Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 14.
6. See, e.g., John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) for a good example of the postwar revisionist school.
7. V.I. Achkasov, et al., *The Combat Course of the Soviet Navy* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974), Foreword by Sergei G. Gorshkov, translation by G.C. Edwards, p. 3.
8. *Ibid.*
9. John Foster Dulles, "The Doctrine of Massive Retaliation," delivered 12 January 1954 before the Council on Foreign Relations, *Department of State Bulletin*, 25 January 1954. Also reprinted in Richard G. Head and Irvin J. Rokke, *American Defense Policy*, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), p. 62.
10. Michael MccGwire, ed., "The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy," *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context* (New York: Praeger, 1973), chap. 26.
11. Gorshkov, Foreword to *The Combat Course of the Soviet Navy*, p. 5.
12. Robin Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962-73* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 11.
13. MccGwire, "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy," p. 119.
14. Gorshkov, p. 5.
15. Michael MccGwire, "The Structure of the Soviet Navy," *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context*, p. 156.
16. This theme appears throughout much of the work of MccGwire. See especially his "Soviet Maritime Strategy: Purposive or Preventive?" *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context*, chap. 36 for a brief capsulation.
17. Gorshkov, p. 5.
18. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 117.
19. Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 95.
20. Ken Booth, *Soviet Naval Developments III* (Summary of Proceedings of Maritime Workshop Seminar) (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1974), p. 12.
21. MccGwire, "The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy," chap. 16.

22. John E. Moore, *The Soviet Navy Today* (New York: Stein & Day, 1976), p. 247.
23. John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, 12 January 1961. Taken from Edward Lewis and Richard Rhodes, ed., *John F. Kennedy: Words to Remember* (New York: Hallmark Cards, 1967), p. 19.
24. John F. Kennedy, Special Message to Congress, 28 March 1961.
25. George and Smoke, p. 416.
26. Edmonds, p. 3.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
30. Kenneth McGruther, "Professional Self-Image and the Soviet Navy," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1978, pp. 71-78.
31. Robert Weinland, "The Changing Mission Structure of the Soviet Navy," *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context*, p. 298.
32. The entire thrust of *Soviet Naval Development*, *Soviet Naval Policy*, *Soviet Naval Influence* and other writings on the Soviet Navy are ample evidence of this fact.
33. George E. Hudson, "Soviet Naval Doctrine, 1953-72," *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context*, chap. 21, p. 298.
34. Moore, p. 247.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
36. McGruther, p. 74.
37. Edmonds, p. 6.
38. Michael J. Deane, *Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy* (Ann Arbor: Xerox University Microfilms, 1974), p. 346, quoting Krasnaia Zvesda, 17 November 1971.

CHAPTER III—MISSIONS

1. Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (New York: Crane & Russak, 1977), p. 179.
2. Sergei Gorshkov, *Seapower of the State* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1976), p. 238.
3. Samuel L. Morison and John S. Rowe, *The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet*, 10th ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975), p. 42.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
5. Gorshkov, p. 248.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 224.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 253.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 262.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 263.
12. K.J. Moore, "Developments in Submarine Systems, 1956-76," chap. 7 in *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Considerations* (New York: Praeger, 1977).
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 196-198.
14. Vincent Davis, "The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases," in Richard G. Head and Irvin J. Rokke, *American Defense Policy*, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), p. 405.
15. Harlan Ullman, "The Counter-Polaris Task," in Michael McGwire, et al., eds., *Soviet Naval Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 587.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 593.
17. Gorshkov, p. 248.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 242.
20. The "withholding" concept was first highlighted by James McConnell and Bradford Dismukes. See McConnell's "The Gorshkov Articles, the New Gorshkov Book, and Their Relation to Policy," chap. 29 in *Soviet Naval Influence*; and Dismukes, "The Soviet General Purpose Forces: Roles and Missions in Wartime," chap. 30 in *Soviet Naval Policy*. McGwire may actually have been the first to suggest the possibility however. See *Soviet Naval Developments* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 473.

21. Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 215.
22. McConnell, p. 577.
23. Gorshkov, pp. 249-251.
24. See particularly Marshal D. Sokolovsky, *Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts* (New York: Praeger, 1963).
25. See also Moore, chap. 7.
26. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 8 November 1961.
27. Ullman, chap. 31.
28. Moore, chap. 7.
29. Michael MccGwire, "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy," *Selected Readings in Strategy and Policy* (Newport, R.I.: U.S. Naval War College, 1976), p. 119.
30. William D. O'Neil, "Backfire: Long Shadow on Sea Lanes," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1977, pp. 26-35.
31. Moore, p. 174.
32. John E. Moore, *The Soviet Navy Today* (New York: Stein & Day, 1976), p. 155.
33. Robert W. Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1968), p. 99.
34. Robert Bathurst, "The Lemming Complex: Ritual Death in the Norwegian Sea," *Naval War College Review*, May-June 1974, pp. 35-42.
35. Most notably James Cable in *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (New York: Praeger, 1971).
36. Gorshkov, p. 222.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 354.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 277.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 320.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
46. Bruce W. Watson, "Comments on Gorshkov's 'Seapower of the State,'" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1977, p. 42.
47. Gorshkov, p. 320.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 349-352.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 350.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 329-345.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.*, p. 271.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 275.
54. Ulrich Schulz-Torge, "The Kiev: A German View," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, July 1977, p. 111.
55. Ken Booth, *Soviet Naval Developments III* (Summary of Proceedings of Maritime Workshop Seminar) (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1974), p. 47.
56. Gorshkov, p. 184.

CHAPTER IV—PROSPECTS

1. Sergei Gorshkov, *Seapower of the State* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1976), pp. 253, 301, 347, 353.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 275.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 352.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 300.
5. Ken Booth, *Soviet Naval Developments III* (Summary of Proceedings of Maritime Workshop Seminar) (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1974), p. 77.
6. Kenneth R. McGruther, "The Role of Perception in Naval Diplomacy," *Naval War College Review*, September-October 1974, pp. 3-20.
7. Michael MccGwire, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments: Capabilities and Context* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 398.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 325-343.
9. The theme was amply summarized by Ken Booth, "If the Sixth Fleet Did Not Exist, Would You Invent It?" Lecture delivered at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 11 March 1977.
10. Center for International Studies, *Soviet Sea Power* (Georgetown: 1969), p. 112.
11. Gorshkov, p. 344.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 174, 352.
13. James W. Kehoe, Jr., "Warship Design: Theirs and Ours," chap. 19 in *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Considerations* (New York: Praeger, 1977).
14. Gorshkov, p. 275.
15. Booth, p. 58.
16. Harlan Ullman, "The Counter-Polaris Task," chap. 31 in Michael MccGwire, et al., eds., *Soviet Naval Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1975).
17. Booth, p. 48.
18. Gorshkov, p. 184.
19. Booth, p. 3.

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